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ARTICLE
PROXIMATE RETRIBUTION
Meghan J. Ryan*
ABSTRACT

An essential element of the theory of retribution has been
missing from courts' and legal scholars' analyses. While they
have outlined a number of varieties of the theory and fleshed out
their nuances, courts and scholars have largely neglected to
examine which harms flowing from a criminal offender's conduct
should be considered in determining that offender's desert. The
more remote harms caused by an offender's conduct, such as the
effects of his offenses on the families and friends of his victims or
the effects of criminal conduct on society in general, are
pervasive in communities across the nation. This Article takes a
first look at this neglected issue of the role that more remote
harms should play in sentencing and asserts that accounting for
these more remote harms under certain conditions would better
reflect the basic tenets of harm-based retributivism-the theory
at the heart of many sentencing schemes. The Article
acknowledges some of the concerns that considering these harms
raises and argues that a proximate causation analysis is
essential to limit the harms considered in sentencing while
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recognizing the full array of harms caused by criminal conduct.
This notion of "proximate retribution" is necessary to rein in
criminal liability under the theory.
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INTRODUCTION

The bounds of retributivism have shifted throughout the
ages. A theory that began as a substantiated breed of vengeance
or retaliation has transformed into a concept used to define an
offender's "just deserts."' It has in many cases evolved from a
pure justification for punishment to what is now often a
limitation on punishment.2 Legal scholars have spent centuries
1.
See Leonard Orland, From Vengeance to Vengeance: Sentencing Reform and the
Demise of Rehabilitation,7 HOFSTRA L. REV. 29, 33 (1978); Alice Ristroph, Desert, Democracy,
and Sentencing Reform, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1293, 1299-1300 (2006).
See Albert W. Alschuler, The Changing Purposes of Criminal Punishment: A
2.
Retrospective on the Past Century and Some Thoughts About the Next, 70 U. CHI. L. REV.
1, 15-19 (2003); Younglae Lee, The Constitutional Right Against Excessive Punishment,
91 VA. L. REV. 677, 699-703 (2005); Ristroph, supra note 1, at 1300. This Article uses the
terms "justification" and "purpose" interchangeably when referring to retribution for the
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debating the nuances of the theory of retribution. They have
disagreed on why an offender deserves punishment-perhaps
because he has acted as a free rider by failing to abide by the law
or because he has sent a message to society that his victims are
of lesser worth.' And scholars have disagreed about how to
determine the precise value of an offender's desert.' Despite
significant attention by scholars, though, one key component of
the theory of retribution seems to have been largely
overlooked.
Both courts and legal scholars have generally neglected the
question of which harms are relevant in retribution-based
sentencing. Ordinarily, courts consider only the most direct
harms caused by criminal conduct, and scholars seem to take for
granted that only these most direct harms, if any harms, are
worth considering.' Neither courts nor scholars have explained,
however, why this is the case, and neither have taken a closer
look at the advantages and disadvantages of considering some of
the more remote harms caused by criminal conduct.6 Perhaps
they should be asking questions such as whether an offender
should be held responsible for the suffering he has caused to the
family of a murder victim, or whether the hurt suffered by a child
rape victim having to testify at the trial of her rapist, should be

sake of convenience even though there is an important distinction between the two terms
in some contexts. See Paul J. Hofer & Mark H. Allenbaugh, The Reason Behind the Rules:
Finding and Using the Philosophy of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 40 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 19, 21 n.6 (2003); Kyron Huigens, On Commonplace Punishment Theory, 2005 U.
CHI. LEGAL F. 437, 439-40; Dan Markel & Chad Flanders, Bentham on Stilts: The Bare
Relevance of Subjectivity to Retributive Justice, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 907, 949 (2010).
Compare Herbert Morris, Persons and Punishment, 52 MONIST 475, 476-78
3.
(1968) (advocating a system that punishes individuals who fail to observe societal rules at
society's expense), with Jean Hampton, Correcting Harms Versus Righting Wrongs: The
Goal of Retribution, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1659, 1660, 1666 (1992) (labeling Morris's conception of
punishment as focusing on "free riders" and denouncing his theory in favor of a moral-based
system that accounts for the human worth of the victim).
See Alschuler, supra note 2, at 10-12; Jeffrey Standen, The New Importance of
4.
Maximum Penalties,53 DRAKE L. REV. 575, 586 & n.63 (2005).
See Paul H. Robinson & Robert Kurzban, Concordance and Conflict in Intuitions
5.
of Justice, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1829, 1846-48 (2007); Meghan J. Ryan, Judging Cruelty, 44
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 81, 106-07 (2010) (noting that the Supreme Court's recent decision in
Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008), "took somewhat of a harm-based retributivist
turn" and extended its "retribution analysis to less direct effects of the offender's conduct,
mark[ing] the outer bounds of the Court's examination of retribution thus far").
Cf Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, FairnessVersus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV.
6.
961, 1239-40 (2001) (noting that many retributivists fail to provide a basis from which to
ascertain the correct magnitude of punishment); discussion infra Parts IV-V (evaluating
the advantages and disadvantages of considering more remote harms in sentencing). But
see Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 823-25 (1991) (considering some of the
consequences of allowing juries to hear victim impact evidence at sentencing).
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considered in sentencing.! These are the very real harms that
both courts and scholars have largely ignored in their work on
sentencing and on defining the bounds of retributivism.
This Article identifies and explores this gap in sentencing
analyses by examining the relevance of more remote harms in
sentencing. Part II briefly traces the history of retributivism and
taxonomizes various modern varieties of the theory. It then
surveys legal scholars' attempts to wrestle with how to determine
the exact value of a particular offender's desert and notes that,
despite this struggle, scholars have largely neglected to ask
which harms are relevant in determining an offender's desert.
Part III examines retributivism's traditional role in criminal
sentencing and highlights the limitations of sentencing in both
guidelines and nonguidelines sentencing systems. It explains
how courts have ignored the more remote harms of criminal
conduct in sentencing and how these more remote harms are real
and present in our communities. Part IV asserts that
consideration of these more remote harms is central to the
foundation of harm-based retributivism-the theory on which
many sentencing schemes are based. Further, accounting for
these harms provides additional benefits, such as furthering
equality among offenders in sentencing, providing an incentive
for offenders to mitigate the harms flowing from their criminal
conduct, and sending a message to society, as well as the
offender, that the harms of criminal conduct are pervasive. Part
V acknowledges that considering some of these more remote
harms may lead to difficulties, such as the appearance that the
criminal justice, system is ranking victims or that some offenders
could be subject to limitless criminal liability for their actions.
These concerns can be ameliorated, Part VI explains, by
overlaying a legal limitation of proximate causation on the
consideration of such harms. This narrowing of harm-based
retribution by a theory of "proximate retribution," the Article
concludes, is necessary to remain true to the basic tenets of
harm-based retributivism while accounting for concerns such as
avoiding exponentially increasing punishments and preserving
the role of mens rea in criminal law.
II. THE THEORY OF RETRIBUTION
The theory of retribution has a rich and complex history.
Throughout the ages, the theory has been modified and

7.
This second question was recently addressed in the Supreme Court case of
Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. at 442-43. See infra text accompanying notes 158-65.
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reformulated and has waxed and waned in popularity.! Scholars
have spent significant time trying to determine the proper
principles underlying retributivism and what limitations should
be placed on this theory justifying punishment;' yet scholars have
generally failed to address whether causing harms in addition to
those most directly related to an offender's criminal conduct
justifies additional punishment."o
A. A History of Retributivism
The penological purpose of retribution was perhaps the first
articulated justification for legal punishment." It can be traced
back to the Hammurabi Code of about 1760 BC," when this early
form of retribution, otherwise known as lex talionis, was cruder
in nature and is said to have taken the shape of retaliation or
vengeance.'" In addition to Hammurabi's Code, the later-written

See Michele Cotton, Back with a Vengeance: The Resilience of Retribution as an
8.
Articulated Purpose of Criminal Punishment, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1313, 1314-17 (2000)
(noting retribution's decline and subsequent rise in American criminal law); Hampton,
supra note 3, at 1685-89 (examining the influence of retribution in several court cases
spanning over a hundred years); infra text accompanying notes 44-53 (describing
retributivism's reconfiguration by contemporary theorists into a balancing of rights).
See, e.g., Adam J. Kolber, The Subjective Experience of Punishment, 109 COLUM.
9.
L. REV. 182, 199-216 (2009) (asserting that retributive punishment ought to account for
an offender's subjective experience of punishment).
Cf Kevin Cole, Deference, Tolerance, and Numbers: A Response to Professor
10.
Wright's View of the Sentencing Commission, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 651, 659-60 (1994)
(suggesting that while a harm-based retributivist might care about indirect harms, courts
should not defer to the Federal Sentencing Commission to adopt such a view based solely
on empirical data); Erik Luna, PrincipledEnforcement of Penal Codes, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L.
REV. 515, 611-12 (2000) (observing that only a few scholars have recognized a distinction
between direct harm and more general impacts on victims).
11.

See MARVIN HENBERG, RETRIBUTION:

EVIL FOR EVIL IN ETHICS, LAW, AND

LITERATURE 60 (1990) (noting that lex talionis is "[t]he first historical, sanctioned, and
arguably moral version of like for like in Western culture"); IGOR PRIMORATZ, JUSTIFYING
LEGAL PUNISHMENT 13 (1989) ("The history of the retributive view of punishment begins
with the biblical and talmudic ethical and legal ideas . . . .").
12.
Morris J. Fish, An Eye for an Eye: Proportionalityas a Moral Principle of
Punishment, 28 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 57, 58 (2008) ("The first written record of the lex
talionis ... has been traced to the Code of Hammurabi . .. in approximately 1760 B.C.");
see also Stephen J. Morse & Morris B. Hoffman, The Uneasy Entente Between Legal
Insanity and Mens Rea: Beyond Clark v. Arizona, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1071,
1113 n.186 (2007) (noting that the Hammurabi Code's "place in history was earned [in
part] because it was the first set of laws, and one of only a handful of known ancient laws,
to make this remedial transition from private revenge to state-imposed punishment"). The
Hammurabi Code, written around 1760 BC, was the first set of laws, and it promulgated
the theory of lex talionis. See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 996 (9th ed. 2009) (defining "lex
talionis"as "[tlhe law of retaliation, under which punishment should be in kind-an eye for an
eye, a tooth for a tooth, and so on-but no more").
13.
See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 12, at 996 (defining "lex talionis" as
"[tlhe law of retaliation, under which punishment should be in kind-an eye for an eye, a
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books of the Biblel4 specifically sanction this form of retribution,
suggesting that the proper punishment for a transgression is an
equal punitive response: an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth."
While this early form of retribution seems harsh, some scholars
have explained that, compared to the unlimited punishments that
preceded the articulation of lex talionis in the Hammurabi Code,
this was a humane innovation in that it actually served as the first
legal limitation on punishment."
In later centuries, scholars such as Kant and Hegel further
developed the theory of retribution and added greater moral

tooth for a tooth, and so on-but no more"); Robert Blecker, Killing Them Softly:
Meditations on a Painful Punishment of Death, 35 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 969, 973 (2008)
("Critics commonly equate retribution with revenge. . .. "); Henry F. Fradella, From the
Legal Literature, 42 CRIM. L. BULL. 498, 504-05 (2006) (explaining that retribution "is
closely tied to the notion of revenge" and that "[rlevenge as a basis for punishment has its
roots in ancient times"); Michael A. Newton, Reconsidering Reprisals, 20 DUKE J. COMP.
& INT'L L. 361, 380 (2010) (explaining that lex talionis "demands equal and exact injury as
a form of revenge against an adversary"); Alexander Tsesis, Contextualizing Bias Crimes: A
Social and Theoretical Perspective, 28 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 315, 329 (2003) (explaining
that lex talionis is closely tied to revenge). But see Dan Markel, What Might Retributive
Justice Be? An Argument for the Confrontational Conception of Retributivism, in
RETRIBuTIVISM: ESSAYS ON THEORY AND POLICY 49, 58-59 (Mark D. White ed., 2011)

(distinguishing retributivism from revenge).
14. These first five books of the Christian Bible are also known as the Pentateuch,
or the Torah in the Jewish tradition. Lee Ann Bambach, The Enforceabilityof Arbitration
Decisions Made by Muslim Religious Tribunals: Examining the Beth Din Precedent, 25
J.L. & RELIGION 379, 382 n.12 (2009).
15. Exodus 21:24-25 (Tanakh) ("[E]ye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot
for foot, burn for burn, wound for wound, bruise for bruise."); Leviticus 24:20 (Tanakh)
("[F]racture for fracture, eye for eye, tooth for tooth. The injury he inflicted on another
shall be inflicted on him."); Deuteronomy 19:21 (Tanakh) ("Nor must you show pity: life for
life, eye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot."); see also ROBERT FRANCIS
HARPER, THE CODE OF HAMMURABI,

KING OF BABYLON: ABOUT 2250 B.C., at 73, 75

(Lawbook Exch., Ltd., 2d ed. 1999) (1904) ("If a man destroy the eye of another man, they
shall destroy his eye.... If a man knock out a tooth of a man of his own rank, they shall
knock out his tooth."). As Professor Igor Primoratz has explained, "the demand for
equality of punishment and offense" could either be interpreted in terms of the offense's
and punishment's specific features-requiring that the offender be subjected to the same
wrong as the victim-or in terms of that "what is common to them, what makes them
comparable: in respect of 'value', or their 'universal property of being injuries."'
PRIMORATZ, supra note 11, at 80-81. This "eye for an eye" concept, often referred to as lex
talionis,is generally not considered part of modern-day retributive theory. See Malcolm E.
Wheeler, Toward a Theory of Limited Punishment: An Examination of the Eighth
Amendment, 24 STAN. L. REV. 838, 846 (1972).
16.
See PRIMORATZ, supra note 11, at 87 (explaining that the biblical demand for
"'life for life [and] eye for eye'. . . did not encourage, but rather restrained the
vengefulness of the wronged"); Lee, supra note 2, at 704 ("Even the cruel-sounding
Biblical version of lex talionis was a limiting principle in its historical context. As Igor
Primoratz explains, the principle served to'restrain[] the vengefulness of the wronged' by
commanding 'for one life, take one, not ten lives; for one eye, take one, not both.'" (quoting
PRIMORATZ, supra note 11, at 87)); see also infra text accompanying note 26 (explaining
that this early retaliative form of retribution is often now viewed as barbaric).
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content to its original form of lex talionis. Kant asserted that
punishment is justified only when an offender's actions are
morally wrong and that the punishment must be equivalent to
the offense committed." While some scholars have equated
Kant's approach to the ancient principle of lex talionis,1 it differs
from at least the vengeance-based interpretation of lex talionis in
that desert, not the victim's or society's thirst for vengeance, is
the only principle justifying punishment.19 Hegel, too,
distinguished his version of retributivism from simple
vengeance.20 He reasoned that punishment must be imposed on
criminal offenders because otherwise the offender's wrong would
be viewed as a "right" by society.2 1 Hegel also argued that
criminal offenders have a right to be punished and that only
through punishment can they be redeemed.2 2
Philosophers and legal scholars have long touted the
appropriateness of retributive punishment, but beginning in the
late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, consequentialist
deterrence, and
theories of punishment-rehabilitation,
incapacitation-challenged retribution's position as the primary

See IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE: PART I OF THE
17.
METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 99-103 (John Ladd trans., The Bobbs-Merrill Co. 1965) (1797)

(asserting that judicial punishment should be imposed only when an individual has
committed a crime and that the punishment should be similar in kind and degree); see
also Michael Tonry, Obsolescence and Immanence in Penal Theory and Policy, 105 COLUM.
L. REV. 1233, 1262 (2005).
See, e.g., Russell L. Christopher, Time and Punishment, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 269,
18.
284 n.50 (2005) (referencing Kant's "famous account of the principle of the lex talionis").
See KANT, supra note 17, at 100 ("Judicial punishment can never be used merely
19.
as a means to promote some other good for the criminal himself or for civil society, but
instead it must in all cases be imposed on him only on the ground that he has committed
a crime; for a human being can never be manipulated merely as a means to the purposes
of someone else .... ."); see also Leo Zaibert, The Ideal Victim, 28 PACE L. REV. 885, 894-95
(2008) (explaining that some "retributivist[s] would insist on punishing the deserving
even in those cases in which 'the criminal's victims are indifferent (or even opposed) to
punishing the one who hurt them'" (quoting MICHAEL MOORE, PLACING BLAME: A
GENERAL THEORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAw 89 (1997))).
See G.W.F. HEGEL, ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT § 101 (Allen W.
20.
Wood ed., H.B. Nisbet trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1991) (1821); Zvi D. Gabbay,
Justifying Restorative Justice: A Theoretical Justification for the Use of Restorative
Justice Practices, 2005 J. DISP. RESOL. 349, 375 ("Hegel proclaims that without focusing
on the offense and the 'injured universal,' punishment would be nothing more than
personal revenge.").
See HEGEL, supra note 20, § 99; MARK TUNICK, HEGEL'S POLITICAL
21.
PHILOSOPHY: INTEGRATING THE PRACTICE OF LEGAL PUNISHMENT 34 (1992).
See HEGEL, supra note 20, § 100; TUNICK, supra note 21, at 35-36; see also Brian K
22.
Payne et al., Justifications for the ProbationSanction Among Residents of Virginia-Coolor
Uncool?, 67 FED. PROBATION 42, 43 (2003) (noting Hegel's belief in the link between
punishment and redemption for criminals and discussing how retribution-based punishments
focus on society's moral obligation to punish criminals).
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justification for punishment in the legal and philosophical
landscapes." By the beginning of the twentieth century,
consequentialist theories of punishment had firmly replaced
retribution as the primary accepted justification for
punishment.2 4 Criminologists had determined that blame was
useless and that criminal behavior was the product of
uncontrollable genetic and environmental factors." They labeled
retribution's focus on retaliation or vengeance as unacceptably
barbaric and considered the theory a remnant of harsher times."
Thus, by 1949, the Supreme Court had concluded that
"[rietribution [was] no longer the dominant objective of the
criminal law."27 And in 1972, Justice Thurgood Marshall

23.
See FRANCIS A. ALLEN, THE DECLINE OF THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL: PENAL
POLICY AND SOCIAL PURPOSE 12-13 (1981) (explaining that "[tihe rehabilitative ideal
became an important element in practical penological thought only when imprisonment
became a principal mode of punishment," which did not take place until the rise of the
prison at the end of the eighteenth century); Cotton, supra note 8, at 1314-17.
24. See Cotton, supra note 8, at 1314-17.
25.
See Alschuler, supra note 2, at 2 ("Many early twentieth-century reformers
doubted their ability to blame."); see also Tonry, supra note 17, at 1239-40 (explaining
that, in the 1930s, "practitioners, policymakers, and professors" embraced utilitarian
justifications of punishment and had difficulty accepting retributive justifications because
"[p]enal sensibilities [at the time] ... included assumptions about the environmental and
psychological causes of criminal behavior, the malleability of human beings, the ethical
desirability of rehabilitating offenders, and the capacity of correctional and other
programs to do so").
26. Blecker, supra note 13, at 973 ("Critics commonly equate retribution with
revenge-disparaging 'an eye for an eye' as barbaric."); see also Laura I. Appleman,
Retributive Justice and Hidden Sentencing, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 1307, 1333 (2007) ("There
have historically been a number of objections to retribution, including its
harshness . . . ."); Ristroph, supra note 1, at 1299 (explaining that critics of retributivism
characterize the theory "as glorified vengeance" but that supporters of the theory
"emphasize[] ways in which retributive punishment serves egalitarian values and respect
for human dignity"); supra text accompanying notes 11-16 (explaining that early forms of
retributivism were vengeance-based or retaliative in nature).
27. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 248 (1949). Further, the Model Penal Code
of 1962 disclaimed retribution as a proper penological purpose, including retribution only
as a limiting principle of punishment while including various other purposes as legitimate
justifications for punishment. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.02 (Official Draft and
Explanatory Notes 1962) (setting forth prevention and rehabilitation as the primary
purposes of punishment); see also id. at Explanatory Note (noting that the relevant
section of the Model Penal Code "states the general purposes of the provisions governing
the sentencing and treatment of offenders, again within the general framework of a
preventative scheme"); cf Cotton, supra note 8, at 1318-19 (suggesting that the
movement away from retributivism and toward consequentialism was prompted by the
drafting and dissemination of the Model Penal Code). But see Cotton, supra note 8, at
1321-22 (noting that some legal scholars have suggested that the Model Penal Code does
incorporate the purpose of retribution but explaining why this is an improper
interpretation of the language of the Code). After the dissemination of the Model Penal
Code, about half of the U.S. states adopted legislative statements on the purposes of
punishment that similarly ignored the traditional primary purpose of retribution. See id.
at 1318-19. Even today, state statutes setting forth the acceptable penological purposes of
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proclaimed that "no one has ever seriously advanced retribution
as a legitimate goal of our society."28
Sometime between the late 1960s and mid-1970s, however,
retribution began reemerging as a legitimate, and even the
primary, justification for punishment.2" Although there is some
disagreement as to when this revolution began, some scholars
have suggested that it stemmed from theories and proposals
discussed in either Herbert Morris's influential Persons and
Punishment, which was published in 1968, or Andrew von
Hirsch's Doing Justice, which was published in 1976." Aside from
punishment state that these purposes are "to protect the public safety and welfare by
preventing the commission of crime through the deterring effect of the sentences
authorized, the rehabilitation of those convicted, and their confinement when the public
safety and interest requires." MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.01(1) (West 2009). But cf Cotton,
supra note 8, at 1324 (noting that some states adopted somewhat different wording).
Some scholars characterize legislators' inclusion of a variety of penological purposes in
criminal offense and sentencing statutes as "retirling] from the debate [among the proper
penological purposes] with the hope that in practice the proper mix of purposes will come
about." George P. Fletcher, Disenfranchisementas Punishment: Reflections on the Racial
Uses of Infamia, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1895, 1895 (1999). But some suggest that such
retirement is appropriate, because "the basic moral principles of legislators do not lend
themselves to floor debate." James M. Galliher & John F. Galliher, A "Commonsense"
Theory of Deterrence and the "Ideology" of Science: The New York State Death Penalty
Debate, 92 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 307, 330 (2002).
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 363 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring).
28.
See Russell L. Christopher, Deterring Retributivism: The Injustice of "Just"
29.
Punishment, 96 Nw. U. L. REV. 843, 845-46 & n.6 (2002) (asserting that "[wihether it is a
'revival,' a 'resurgence,' or a 'renaissance,' retributivism's rapid 'rise' since the early 1970s has
been remarkable" but noting that "[t]here is some disagreement as to when the revitalization
of retributivism began" (footnotes omitted)); Cotton, supra note 8, at 1355-56 (explaining that
retribution reemerged as the primary justification for punishment); David Dolinko, Three
Mistakes ofRetributivism, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1623, 1623 (1992) ("It is widely acknowledged that
retributivism, once treated as an irrational vestige of benighted times, has enjoyed in recent
years so vigorous a revival that it can fairly be regarded today as the leading philosophical
justification of the institution of criminal punishment." (footnote omitted)); Martin R.
Gardner, The Renaissance of Retribution-An Examination of Doing Justice, 1976 WIs.
L. REV. 781, 783-84 ("With this disillusionment with the traditional utilitarian rationales for
punishment, retribution is suddenly being seen by thinkers of all political persuasions as
perhaps the strongest ground, after all, upon which to base a system of punishment.").
30. See Hadar Aviram, Humonetarianism: The New Correctional Discourse of
Scarcity, 7 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L.J. 1, 10 (2010) (stating that von Hirsch's Doing
Justice "is considered by many to have rekindled retributivism as the basis for
sentencing"); Stephanos Bibas, Originalism and Formalism in Criminal Procedure: The
Triumph of Justice Scalia, the Unlikely Friendof Criminal Defendants?, 94 GEO. L.J. 183,
194 n.75 (2005) (noting that Doing Justice "spearhead[ed] the resurgence of retribution as
the dominant penal philosophy"); Christopher, supra note 29, at 846 n.6 (naming Persons
and Punishment as a possible starting point for the revitalization of retributivism). See
generally ANDREW VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTS xxxiv, Xl
(1976) (explaining the conclusions of the Committee for the Study of Incarceration, which
amount to "a departure from tradition" and a "retreat[ I from a concept of individualized
justice [and] discretion in sentencing"); Morris, supra note 3, at 475-76 (arguing that a
criminal offender has an inalienable right to be punished and that to deny this right
"implies the denial of all moral rights and duties").
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philosophical musings on the matter, however, courts once again
began adopting retributivist rationales for punishment in the
mid-1970s, even despite state laws limiting the purposes of
punishment to deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation."
Courts often accomplished this through either ignoring the
governing state law or by employing a nonbinding judicial
opinion as binding precedent." For example, in 1978, despite the
Minnesota statute providing that the relevant purposes of
punishment include only deterrence, rehabilitation, and
incapacitation," the Minnesota Supreme Court quoted without
disapproval a district court's statement that sentencing decisions
incorporate many considerations, including retribution.34 The
Maine Supreme Judicial Court similarly disregarded statutory
consequentialist language when, in 1978, it determined that a
court should take into account "the interest of the public in
retribution" when sentencing and that the sentence should be
"tailored to the individual characteristics and deserts of the
particular defendant."" Other courts instead cited nonbinding
U.S. Supreme Court statements as justification for embracing
retributivism despite the theory's complete absence from
statutory sentencing policy statements. The Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals, for example, explained that the 1976 U.S.
Supreme Court case of Gregg v. Georgia" recognized retribution
as a legitimate penological purpose and that this essentially
trumped state law.17 While the three-Justice plurality opinion in
Gregg had certainly stated that "[t]he death penalty is said to
serve two principal social purposes: retribution and deterrence,"
it did not command that states use the theory of retribution as a
justification for any, and certainly not all, punishments
imposed." As one scholar has pointed out, "what is

31.
See infra text accompanying notes 32-41.
32.
Cotton, supra note 8, at 1325. Professor Cotton suggests that injecting retributivist
rationales into sentencing statutes was also accomplished through statutory construction. Id.
33.
See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.01(1) (West 1963); see also Cotton, supra note 8, at
1324, 1326 (describing the statute as "clearly nonretributive").
34. See State ex rel. Taylor v. Schoen, 273 N.W.2d 612, 615-16 (Minn. 1978) ("Many
considerations are embodied in a prison sentence, not the least of which [is] punishment. . .."
(internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Cotton, supra note 8, at 1326 & n.49.
35.
State v. Samson, 388 A.2d 60, 67-68 (Me. 1978).
36.
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
37. See Adams v. State, 577 S.W.2d 717, 729 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979), rev'd on other
groundsby Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38 (1980).
38.
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 183 (plurality opinion). The Gregg case involved only the
punishment of death, and the Court has stated numerous times that a punishment may
be constitutional if it serves either the purpose of retribution or deterrence. See, e.g.,
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319 (2002) ("Unless the imposition of the death penalty
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constitutionally permissible is not the same thing as what is
state law."39 By 1984, the U.S. Supreme Court had explicitly
recognized retribution as "an element of all punishments society
imposes,"'o and today, many scholars conclude that retributivism
is the leading theory for justifying punishment.4 1
B. A Taxonomy of Retributivist Theories
One of the reasons that retribution reemerged as a
justification for punishment is that retributivism was
repackaged as an egalitarian concept of "just deserts" rather
than as a tool of vengeance." Although, historically, retribution
had been viewed by many as a primal urge to harm others who
have harmed us," some contemporary theorists have
reconfigured retributivism as a balance of rights-a formulation
more palatable to post-Enlightenment liberal ideals." This

on a mentally retarded person measurably contributes to one or both of these goals [of
retribution and deterrence], it is nothing more than the purposeless and needless
imposition of pain and suffering, and hence an unconstitutional punishment." (internal
quotation marks omitted)); see also Ryan, supra note 5, at 136 & n.300 (explaining that,
while the Supreme Court has not been entirely clear that the Punishments Clause does
not require that a punishment serve both retributive and deterrent functions to be upheld
as constitutional, most Punishment Clause cases seem to adopt the position that serving
either a retributive or a deterrent function will suffice).
39.
Cotton, supra note 8, at 1329. Professor Cotton describes the Texas court as
"exaggeratling] the tenor, scope, and significance of the three-justice opinion," id. at 1327,
and accuses other state courts citing Gregg for this proposition of mischaracterizing the
Gregg opinion, id. at 1334.
Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 462 (1984).
40.
See, e.g., Dolinko, supra note 29, at 1623 ("It is widely acknowledged that
41.
retributivism, once treated as an irrational vestige of benighted times, has enjoyed in
recent years so vigorous a revival that it can fairly be regarded today as the leading
philosophical justification of the institution of criminal punishment." (footnote omitted));
R.A. Duff, In Defence of One Type of Retributivism: A Reply to Bagaric and Amarasekara,
24 MELB. U. L. REV. 411, 411 (2000) ("A striking feature of penal philosophising during
the last thirty years has been the revival of retributivism."); James S. Gwin, Juror
Sentiment on Just Punishment:Do the FederalSentencing Guidelines Reflect Community
Values?, 4 HARV. L. & POL'Y REV. 173, 180-82 (2010) (arguing that retributivism is the
primary theory justifying punishment under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines);
Hampton, supra note 3, at 1659 ("There has been a steady rise in the popularity of
retributivism over the last decade, which is surprising given its near death in the 1950's
and 1960's.").
42.
This new formulation of retributivism was accompanied by scholars' abandonment of
the traditional term "retributivism" and adoption of the more historically neutral terminology
of "just deserts." Ristroph, supra note 1, at 1300. But see Markel,supra note 13, at 62 ("[D]esert
should not be the key focus as we talk about retributive justice.").
43.
See Ristroph, supra note 1, at 1299; see also supra text accompanying notes
11-16 (explaining that retributivism was originally viewed as a theory of vengeance or
retaliation).
44.
See Ristroph, supra note 1, at 1299; see also Robert F. Cochran, Jr., "How Do
You Plead, Guilty or Not Guilty?": Does the Plea Inquiry Violate the Defendant's Right to
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modern egalitarian conception of retributivism comes in a variety
of forms." One type of egalitarian retributivism, known as
protective retributivism, suggests that punishing criminals for
their wrongdoing is necessary to restore a balance in society.46
Society is built on rules that, for the benefit of the community,
forbid certain harmful conduct." Each of these rules imposes
burdens on members of the community, and by committing a
crime, the offender enjoys the benefits of a stable society but
frees himself of the burdens of following the law.48 The free-rider
offender, then, must pay the debt that he owes to society through
criminal punishment.4 9 Another formulation of egalitarian
retributivism-victim vindication-uses punishment to right a
wrong.' The offender has committed a wrong through his offense,
which sent a message to the victim and all of society that the
offender's rights are more valuable than the victim's rights."
Through punishing the offender, society corrects the offender's
unfounded statement and reaffirms the victim's worth, thus

Silence?, 26 CARDOzO L. REV. 1409, 1448 (2005) (describing Enlightenment liberalism as
elevating an individual's freedom, autonomy, and privacy "at the expense of [the]
community"). Scholars have also adopted other varieties of retributivism, but these are
too numerous to outline in this Article.
45. In egalitarian retributivism, "[plunishment must be imposed to respect the
dignity of the victim as well as the dignity of the wrongdoer." Ristroph, supra note 1, at
1300.
46. See, e.g., Morris, supra note 3, at 477-78 (explaining that punishment is
justified because an offender "owes something to others, for he has something that does
not rightfully belong to him" and that punishment "restores the equilibrium of benefits
and burdens by taking from the individual what he owes, that is, exacting the debt"). This
theory suggests that each individual must share equally the burdens of the law and that
those who violate the law are still enjoying the benefits of the law but have exempted
themselves from the burdens of it. See Ristroph, supra note 1, at 1299.
47.

See Morris, supra note 3, at 477.

48.
49.

See id.
See id. at 477-78; Ristroph, supra note 1, at 1299.

50.

See JEFFRIE G. MURPHY & JEAN HAMPTON, FORGIVENESS AND MERCY 124-37

(1988); Hampton, supra note 3, at 1686. But see Christopher, supra note 29, at 944
(suggesting that victim vindication might be consequentialist in nature). In addition to
protective retributivism and victim vindication, there is a third variety of retributivism
known as assaultive retributivism. See Margaret Jane Radin, Cruel Punishment and
Respect for Persons: Super Due Process for Death, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 1143, 1169 (1980)
(characterizing assaultive retributivists as more likely "to argue for more punishment in
the world" and to "rely covertly on a form of utilitarianism, or on a social contract theory
that assumes what they are trying to prove"). This version of retributivism posits that it
is proper to punish criminals based on desert because it is morally justified to hate
criminals, and this theory is more reminiscent of the primarily rejected concept of lex
talionis. See id. at 1169, 1173 ("'[Alssaultive' retributivists... are likely to stress the
absolute aspect of proportionality --]e.g., a killer ought to be killed; a rapist ought to be
raped. . . ."); supra notes 11-16 and accompanying text.
51. MURPHY & HAMPTON, supra note 50, at 124-25, 128; see Hampton, supra note 3,
at 1686.
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restoring the balance to the individuals' dignities. 2 In that sense,
retribution serves both communicative and expressive functions
in that it signals to the wrongdoer and to society that the
offender's actions are unacceptable."
Some scholars have explained that, in addition to
repackaging retributivism as a theory of egalitarianism, criminal
theorists have girded this modern version of retributivism by
updating the philosophical foundation of the penological
justification." The traditional concept of retributivism eschewed
consequentialist theories because they failed to respect the rights
of individuals and, contrary to the teachings of Kant, used
5 Further,
punishment as a means rather than an end in itself."
pure consequentialism posed the risk of punishing innocent
individuals for the good of society." The new retributivism of the
late twentieth century, however, attempted to reconcile
retributivist goals with those of consequentialists." This
updating means that retributivism now often draws to some
extent on consequentialist theories of punishment, such as
deterrence, and uses this to appeal to a broader support base." In
52.
MURPHY & HAMPTON, supra note 50, at 125-29, 133-35; Hampton, supra note 3,
at 1686; see Ristroph, supra note 1, at 1299. Under this theory, punishment "symbolize[s]

the subjugation of the subjugator, the domination of the one who dominated the victim.
And the message carried in this subjugation is, 'What you did to her, she can do to you. So
you're equal.'" Jean Hampton, An Expressive Theory of Retribution, in RETRIBUTIVISM AND

ITS CRITICS 1, 13 (Wesley Cragg ed., 1992).
53.
Jean Hampton, The Moral Education Theory of Punishment, 13 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 208, 215-17, 227 (1984); see JOEL FEINBERG, The Expressive Function of Punishment,
in DOING AND DESERVING 95-101 (1970); ROBERT NOZICK, PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS

370-71, 374, 376-77 (1981); Hampton, supra note 3, at 1686-87 (1992); see also Alon
Harel & Ariel Porat, Aggregating ProbabilitiesAcross Cases: Criminal Responsibility for

Unspecified Offenses, 94 MINN. L. REV. 261, 304-05 (2009) (summarizing the theories of
expressivists); cf Robert D. Sloane, The Expressive Capacityof InternationalPunishment:
The Limits of the National Law Analogy and the Potentialof InternationalCriminal Law,
42 STAN. J. INT'L L. 39, 70 (2007) ("Expressivism is not or need not be, strictly speaking, a
self-sufficient 'justification' for punishment; it is a function and essential characteristic of

punishment as a social institution." (footnote omitted)). But cf Harel & Porat, supra, at
304 (suggesting that retributivism and expressivism are two separate schools of thought);
Mary Sigler, Private Persons, Public Functions, and the Meaning of Punishment, 38 FLA.

ST. U. L. REV. 149, 165 (2010) (asserting that expressive and communicative theories of
punishment "do not fit neatly into either the utilitarian or retributive categories, for they
typically reflect elements of both"). The "communicative" function of punishment refers to
sending a message to an offender, whereas the "expressive" function of punishment refers
to sending a message to the public. See Markel & Flanders,supra note 2, at 929 n.89.
54. See Fish, supra note 12, at 66 (summarizing Hart's position); Ristroph, supra
note 1, at 1299.
55.

See KANT, supra note 17, at 100; Christopher, supra note 29, at 864; Fish, supra

note 12, at 63, 67.
56. See Dolinko, supra note 29, at 1632-33.
57.
58.

See Fish, supranote 12, at 66-67; Ristroph, supra note 1, at 1305-06.
See Fish, supra note 12, at 66-67; Ristroph, supra note 1, at 1299.
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enveloping consequentialist theories into its formulation, this
more modern version of retributivism has, in many instances,
metamorphosed from employing retribution as a justification for
punishment to using it only as a limitation on punishment." For
example, perhaps the permutation of this modern version of
retributivism that has gained the most traction among courts
and scholars is "limiting retributivism," which uses the tenets of
ordinary retributivism to determine the appropriate endpoints on
an acceptable range of punishment and uses consequentialist
theories to determine the particular punishment within that
range.60 One scholar has even noted that most American
jurisdictions have adopted such a hybrid theory of punishment.6'
Beyond variations in terms of explaining why punishment is
justified under a theory of retribution, or whether retribution
should be employed as a justification for or limitation on
punishment, there are differing theories on how to evaluate an
offender's desert.62 For example, intent-based retributivists
believe that one deserves punishment for his culpable state of
mind." They believe that it is unfair to treat culpable defendants
59. See Ristroph, supra note 1, at 1299 (discussing how retributivism uses the
egalitarian model to limit punishment to the amount necessary to "restore a just
distribution of the burdens of the law").
60. See id. at 1301-04.
61. See Richard S. Frase, Punishment Purposes,58 STAN. L. REV. 67, 76, 78 (2005)
("[A]lmost every system has adopted some form of what Norval Morris called 'limiting
retributivism' (also known as modified just deserts).").
See generally Adam J. MacLeod, All For One: A Review of Victim-Centric
62.
Justificationsfor CriminalPunishment, 13 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 31, 33-35, 40-45 (2008)

(examining the views of "Blackstonian retributivists" and "victim-centrists").
Andrew Ashworth, Criminal Attempts and the Role of Resulting Harm Under
63.
the Code, and in the Common Law, 19 RUTGERS L.J. 725, 735-36 (1988). Some scholars

refer to intent-based retributivists as subjectivists or to intent-based retribution as either
deontological or empirical desert. See, e.g., Kevin Cole, The Voodoo We Do: Harm,
Impossibility, and the Reductionist Impulse, 1994 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL IsSUES 31, 49

("When I refer to 'subjectivism' in this paper, I am referring to intent-based
retributivism."); Paul H. Robinson, Competing Conceptions of Modern Desert: Vengeful,

Deontological, and Empirical, 67 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 145, 148-50 (2008) (categorizing
conceptions of desert as either vengeful, which focuses on the harm done; deontological,
which "focuses on the blameworthiness of the offender"; or empirical, which also "focuses
on the blameworthiness of the offender"). Deontological retribution focuses "on the
blameworthiness of the offender, as drawn from the arguments and analyses of moral
philosophy." Robinson, supra, at 148. Empirical retribution "focuses on the
blameworthiness of the offender... [blut in determining the principles by which
punishment is to be assessed, it looks not to philosophical analyses but rather to the
community's intuitions of justice." Id. at 149. Deontological retribution has the advantage
of having the "ability to produce true principles of justice independent of personal or
community opinion," and empirical retribution has the advantage of being effective in
deterring crime because it draws on the community's abstract notions of right and wrong.
See id. at 153 ("The special value of the empirical conception of desert is its utilitarian
effectiveness in crime-control; the special value of the deontological conception of desert is
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differently based on the "moral luck" of whether their culpable
actions actually caused harm.64 In contrast, finding reason to be
less troubled by holding offenders of similar culpabilities to
different levels of responsibility, harm-based retributivists
believe the harms an offender causes are relevant to the severity
of his punishment." To the extent that American sentencing
systems are retribution-based, they are often harm-based
systems in a number of respects." This is exhibited, for example,
in that they punish attempts less seriously than they punish
completed crimes and that they punish felony murders as
severely as ordinary intentional murders even though the
defendant may not have intended to kill the victim." Despite

its ability to produce true principles of justice independent of personal or community
opinion.").
64. See Ashworth, supra note 63, at 736-37; Kenneth W. Simons, When Is Strict
CriminalLiability Just?, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1075, 1105 (1997) (noting that
the argument that retributivism is consistent with moral luck is controversial).
Ashworth, supra note 63, at 735-36; see, e.g., Michael S. Moore, The
65.
Independent Moral Significance of Wrongdoing, 5 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 237, 238-40
(1994) (asserting that the "standard educated view"-that whether a wrongful action
causes harm has no moral significance independent from culpability-is "mistaken").
Some scholars refer to harm-based retributivists as objectivists or to harm-based
retribution as "vengeful desert." See, e.g., Cole, supra note 63, at 48, 50-51; Robinson,
supra note 63, at 147. One harm-based retributivist, Professor Robert Nozick, has reduced
the theory to a mathematical formula, equating justified retribution with the degree of
culpability times the harm caused or risked (R = r x H). Adil Ahmad Haque, Lawrence v.
Texas and the Limits of the Criminal Law, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 21-22 (2007)
(citing ROBERT NOzICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 60 (1974)).
See Adam L. Alter, Julia Kernochan & John M. Darley, Transgression
66.
Wrongfulness Outweighs Its Harmfulness as a Determinantof Sentence Severity, 31 LAW
& HUM. BEHAv. 319, 320 (2007) (noting that most American jurisdictions require
wrongfulness and harmfulness for criminal liability); Donald A. Dripps, Fundamental
Retribution Error: Criminal Justice and the Social Psychology of Blame, 56 VAND. L. REV.
1383, 1402 (2003) (noting that the attempt or success distinction of harm-based
retribution has "survived in positive law"); Gary T. Lowenthal, Mandatory Sentencing
Laws: Undermining the Effectiveness of DeterminateSentencing Reform, 81 CALIF. L. REV.
61, 104-05 (1993) ("Harm-based retribution is the principle of the [Federal Sentencing
Gluidelines. . . ."); Janice Nadler & Mary R. Rose, Victim Impact Testimony and the
Psychology of Punishment, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 419, 423 (2003) ("Empirical research on
the psychology of justice supports an emerging consensus that people's punishment
judgments are guided to a large degree by a harm-based retributive psychology."); Ryan,
supra note 5, at 103 n.121 ("[Miost courts take into account the harm caused by the
defendant when determining the proper punishment to be imposed."). But see Kyron
Huigens, Solving the Apprendi Puzzle, 90 GEO. L.J. 387, 415-16 (2002) (asserting that
"simple-minded consequentialism"-"lengthy incapacitation and an 'economy of threats'
deterrence" animate the Federal Sentencing Guidelines rather than rehabilitation or
retribution).
67.
See Kevin Cole, Killings During Crime: Toward a Discriminating Theory of
Strict Liability, 28 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 73, 74-75 (1990) ("The felony-murder rule brands a
killer as a murderer even if a jury would conclude that the killer did not intend to kill the
[iintent-based
[whereas]
victim, but merely intended to rob the victim,
retributivists ... insist that the killer should be treated as just another robber unless

1064

HOUSTON LAW REVIEW

[48:5

harm-based retribution's prevalence in American sentencing,
many scholars are resistant to this version of retributivism and
instead favor an intent-based approach.68
C. Assigning Desert
When adopting a conception of retribution, questions arise
about how to determine the exact value of an offender's desert."
Indeed, one of the central criticisms of retributivism is that it
fails to offer a means by which to assess the particular level of
punishment that an offender deserves.o While numerous
empirical studies demonstrate that individuals across cultures
generally agree on the relative, or ordinal," ranking of standard
criminal offenses," there seems to be little agreement as to the
cardinal ranking-or the weighted sequencing-of these
offenses." Although these concerns of ordinal and cardinal

some independent finding of the killer's criminal mens rea is made respecting the
killing."); Moore, supra note 65, at 280 (explaining that felony murder is an example of an
"impure strict liability" crime-one "that ... require[s] some culpable mental state
but .. . do[es] not attach such culpability requirements to all material elements of the
offense"); Ryan, supra note 5, at 102-03 & n.118 (explaining that theories of harm-based
retribution suggest punishing attempt offenses less severely than completed offenses).
But see Ryan, supra note 5, at 104 n.123 (acknowledging that some scholars have asserted
that intent-based retributivism also supports the felony murder rule). The Court has
limited, to some extent, the constitutionality of the felony murder doctrine. See Tison v.
Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 149 (1987); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 801 (1982); Ryan,
supranote 5, at 103-04 & n.123.
68. See Moore, supra note 65, at 238-40 (explaining that the "standard educated
view" denies "wrongdoing" as relevant to determining an offender's desert).
69. See Steven G. Gey, Justice Scalia's Death Penalty, 20 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 67, 130
(1992) (asserting that a primary criticism of the theory "is that retributivists have no way
of accurately measuring the level of moral guilt necessary to justify punishment").
70. Id.; see Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 6, at 1238-39 (identifying as some of the
central criticisms of retributivism the difficulties of "assess[ing] the degree of
wrongfulness" and "determin[ing] the proper punishment given a view of the magnitude
of the wrong").
71. The problem of "ordinal ranking" relates to the concern that more serious crimes
should be punished more severely than less serious crimes. See Paul H. Robinson, The
A.L.I.'s Proposed Distributive Principle of "Limiting Retributivism": Does It Mean in
PracticeAnything Other than Pure Desert?, 7 BUFF. CRiM. L. REV. 3, 10 (2003) (suggesting
that desert demands ordinal ranking-"that a case of greater blameworthiness receive
greater punishment than a case of comparatively less blameworthiness").
72. See generally Robinson & Kurzban, supra note 5 (reviewing empirical studies
establishing an agreement on ordinal ranking and reiterating the findings of earlier
studies that there is no agreement on cardinal ranking).
73. See id. at 1881-82. Outside the context of criminal law, Professor Daphna
Lewinsohn-Zamir has explained:
An "ordinal" ranking of preferences represents the order of an individual's
preferences. Any numbers used in such ranking indicate only the sequence of
preferences and do not convey information about the strength of preferences.
In a "cardinal" ranking, by contrast, there is meaning to the differences
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ranking have received significant scholarly attention, both
protective retributivists and victim vindication retributivists
have generally left the question of the particular punishment
that an offender deserves up to judges, legislators, and
sentencing commissions.74 While scholars have at least
recognized the difficulty of cardinal ranking, they have largely
neglected to identify the issue of which particular harms caused
by an offender's criminal conduct are relevant in determining
ordinal and cardinal offense rankings." But an assessment of
which harms matter is important because it could impact the
determination of which punishment the offender actually
deserves. An exception to this general oversight by scholars,
though, Andrew von Hirsch has opined that "[t]he consequences
that should be considered in gauging the harmfulness of an act
should be those that can fairly be attributed to the actor's choice[,
which] militates .. . against including in harm the unforeseeable
consequences of the act."" The details of von Hirsch's reasoning,
however, remain somewhat unclear." Michael Moore has also

between the numbers attached to rankings. The distances between the ranked
preferences designate the intensity with which one alternative is preferred to
the other.
Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, Identifying Intense Preferences, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1391,
1393 n.7 (2009).
74. See infra Part III.
75. But cf supra text accompanying notes 63-64 (explaining that intent-based
retributivists base punishment on the offender's culpability).
ANDREW VON HIRSCH, PAST OR FUTURE CRIMES: DESERVEDNESS AND
76.
DANGEROUSNESS IN THE SENTENCING OF CRIMINALS 64-65 (1985). Von Hirsch also stated

that this premium on an actor's choice further militates against including within the
notion of harm "the consequences wrought by other independent actors who happen to
choose similar actions." Id. at 65. He explained that an offender should not be held
responsiblefor actions that he does not commit personally even if his actions contribute to
a larger harm. Id. at 64-65. As an example, he stated that "[slhoplifting is not rendered
serious by the large number of persons who commit this crime and by the aggregate
economic injury done, for no shoplifter has control over the number of other persons who
choose to engage in this conduct." Id. at 65.
77. The sources that von Hirsch cites for his proposition-Doing Justice and an
article he published in the Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology-alsoprovide little
explanation for his assertion. Other scholars have similarly avoided addressing the issue
of which harms are relevant in determining an offender's desert. See, e.g., Andrew von
Hirsch & Nils Jareborg, Gauging Criminal Harm: A Living-Standard Analysis, 11
OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 4 (1991) (determining that "[p]articular criminal acts are too
diverse to be rated on an individualized basis," explaining that issues of "aggravation and
mitigation" are "complex enough to call for a separate article," and examining only the
"standard harm involved in a given category or subcategory of crime"). A few
commentators have delved into the closely related question of what constitutes a victim,
but they have primarily limited their inquiries to the definition of victim under the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines. See generally Jessie K. Liu, Victimhood, 71 Mo. L. REV.
115, 117-20, 143-46, 164 (2006) (examining the issue of victimhood under the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines and proposing a definition for the term "victim"); Andrew Nash,
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discussed the relevance of unforeseeable harms in his attempt to
"dissolve" the notion of "moral luck" as an objection to harm-based
retribution." Unlike von Hirsch's statement, however, Moore's
account does not include an assertion about which harms should
be considered in sentencing. Instead, Moore concludes that,
because only harms that are caused "normally," rather than
"freakishly," are considered in determining an offender's desert,
the offender will be held responsible for only those consequences
that he could have foreseen, and thus the problem of "moral luck"
disappears."
Protective retributivists, who premise punishment on the
wrongs committed against society," would presumably look to
the harms society has suffered as a result of the offender's action
if their protective retributivism is harm-based. When
determining a murderer's desert, for example, one would expect
harm-based protective retributivists to consider the harm the
murder caused to society due to the fact that murder is
considered blameworthy not just because it results in the death
of the victim but because it also causes society to suffer."' After
all, society has lost one of its members, and the murderer has
disparaged the community's teaching that murder is immoral."
As William Blackstone has explained, the "private wrong"
against the victim "is swallowed up in the public."" In fact, some
scholars have asserted that this public conception of crime is
central in American law," which is reflected in the practices of
allowing only government prosecutors, not victims, to prosecute

Note, Victims by Definition, 85 WASH. U. L. REv. 1419, 1420, 1435-36, 1456-57 (2008)
(exploring the role of victims under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and proposing a
definition for the term "victim" under the Guidelines).
78. Moore, supra note 65, at 253. Despite Moore's attempt to "dissolve" the objection
of "moral luck," his argument does not seem to have found much traction among legal
scholars.
79. Id. at 254-56, 258. This account of Moore's explanation is over-simplified, thus
for a fuller understanding of Moore's account of the disappearance of "moral luck," please
see id. at 253-58.
80. See MacLeod, supra note 62, at 33-34 (characterizing this as the "Blackstonian
view").
81. See id. ("In the Blackstonian conception, murder" is considered blameworthy
because of "the loss that the community suffers-the loss of one of its members and the
murderer's disparagement of the community's teaching that murder is immoral-[which]
suffices to justify punishing the murderer.").
82. Id. at 34.
83.

4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *6.

84. See MacLeod, supra note 62, at 34 ("In American criminal law, the defining
parameters of criminal prohibitions continue to lie along these principles [that criminal
conduct constitutes an offense against society and that the societal harm caused justifies
punishing the offender].").
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defendants and of captioning criminal cases as the government
entity against the offender." Despite all of this, retributivists
seem to neglect specifically examining the resulting harms in
society in each case and instead either appeal to society's
members to settle the moral depravity of an act 6 or else grope
within the province of philosophy for an answer to how morally
wrong an act is." For example, researchers have surveyed
individuals to assess their views on the punishments that
offenders deserve for committing crimes such as robbery and
murder." Overwhelmingly, though, these surveys fail to mention
the more remote harms caused by the listed offenses." Other
scholars have instead proposed a scheme by which to measure
the wrongfulness of an act based upon the personal interests
impaired by the crime, such as the immediate victim's physical
integrity, financial position, freedom from humiliation, and
privacy. 0 It is, of course, possible that societal harms are
generally approximated and already entered into the punishment
calculus in determining baseline punishments that are available

Id. at 34-35.
85.
See, e.g., Robinson & Kurzban, supra note 5, at 1848-50 (describing
86.
questionnaire studies designed to determine people's intuitions of justice based on the
punishment they believed that offenders should incur as the result of committing various
offenses); see also Paul H. Robinson, The Role of Moral Philosophers in the Competition
Between Deontological and Empirical Desert, 48 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1831, 1834-36
(2007) (describing this concept of "empirical desert").
See MacLeod, supra note 62, at 33-34 (explaining why certain wrongs are
87.
considered blameworthy under the Blackstonian conception).
See Robinson & Kurzban, supra note 5, at 1848-50.
88.
See id.
89.
90.
See von Hirsch & Jareborg, supra note 77, at 19-20 (proposing a framework by
which the seriousness of crimes can be more accurately measured). Von Hirsch has
been characterized as a protective retributivist. See Joseph L. Hoffmann, On the
Perils of Line-Drawing: Juveniles and the Death Penalty, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 229, 247
(1989) ("[V]on Hirsch advocated a retributive theory of punishment ... which in modem
times has been labeled 'protective retributivism' ... ."). Other scholars have suggested
that the punishment imposed should be proportionate to the harm caused to the
immediate victim but have said little about how to determine the actual punishment
imposed. For example, Herbert Morris, who explained that premising punishment on the
violation of rules that "establish a mutuality of benefit and burden and in which the
benefits of noninterference are conditional upon the assumption of burdens . .. is both
reasonable and just," did not delve into the nuances of how to determine the appropriate
punishment to impose. Morris, supra note 3, at 477; see also George P. Fletcher, The
Right and the Reasonable, 98 HARV. L. REV. 949, 961 (1985) (stating that, in a number of
retributive theories, there are two inquiries: (1) "whether there is a wrong to be
punished," and (2) "if so, how grievous it is"); Lynne N. Henderson, The Wrongs of Victim's
Rights, 37 STAN. L. REv. 937, 991 (1985) (noting that Kant's and Herbert Morris's
approaches to moral blameworthiness "embody a proportionality principle-a
correspondence between the wickedness of the act and the suffering to be inflicted upon
the actor").
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under sentencing guidelines or statutes," but even if this were
the case, it is suspect that these harms would be the same in
every case and thus could be accounted for in such a generic
fashion.
Those who subscribe to a theory of retribution more akin to
victim vindication predictably assert that the justification to
punish stems from the victims' interests rather than societal
interests, which are sometimes more removed from the specific
criminal conduct at issue.92 Ordinarily, under a harm-based
version of this theory, an offender would be punished based on
the harm he causes to a particular victim." As one scholar
explains, under victim vindication, punishment serves to "'even[ I
the score' between the victim and the offender."94 Professor
George Fletcher, though, has focused on a representative victim
group, rather than the particular victim, in pinpointing what
harms punishment must balance." Further, he seemingly
extends liability under this argument by asserting that actions
not resulting in victim harm should still be punished so as to
ensure equal treatment among offenders and avoid "the
phenomenon of impunidad-[allowing one to] remain[ ]

91.
This may, for example, be the case with hate crimes, which are often said "to
inflict greater individual and societal harm." See Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476,
487-88 (1993).
92.
See Jennifer M. Collins, Crime and Parenthood: The Uneasy Case for
ProsecutingNegligent Parents, 100 Nw. U. L. REV. 807, 838 (2006). But cf MacLeod, supra
note 62, at 34 (asserting that the American criminal justice system subscribes to a
retributive theory that looks to societal interests in assessing punishment). Professors
Adil Ahmad Haque and Jean Hampton adopt similar forms of victim vindication. See
Hampton, supra note 3, at 1686 ("[Rletribution is a response to a wrong that is intended
to vindicate the value of the victim denied by the wrongdoer's action. . . ."); Haque, supra
note 65, at 22-25 (discussing one interpretation of retribution as requiring "the existence
of a victim whose rights the state seeks to vindicate through punishment").
93.
See Collins, supra note 92, at 838 (noting how punishment serves as a form of
compensation by placing the victim in the position she would have been in if the criminal
offense had not occurred).
94. Id. at 837-38 (citing JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 18 (3d
ed. 2001)); see also Guyora Binder, Victims and the Significance of Causing Harm, 28
PACE L. REV. 713, 736 (2008) ("The conception of state punishment as a substitute for
private vengeance implies an undertaking to vindicate particular victims by avenging
actual harms. . .. "); Orde F. Kittrie, Averting Catastrophe: Why the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty Is Losing Its Deterrence Capacity and How to Restore It, 28 MICH.
J. INT'L L. 337, 359 (2007) ("Under the victim vindication variant, retribution is achieved
when the criminal receives punishment proportional to the offense to the victim.").
95.
See George P. Fletcher, Justice and Fairness in the Protection of Crime Victims,
9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 547, 556-57 (2005); George P. Fletcher, The Place of Victims in
the Theory of Retribution, 3 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 51, 51, 54-55 (1999); see also MacLeod,
supra note 62, at 44 (noting that Fletcher's "communities are merely subsets of the
community at large").
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unpunished for one's crimes." As with protective retributivism
in practice, though, punishment under a harm-based theory of
victim vindication focuses primarily on harms caused to
immediate victims of the offender's conduct and on restoring this
particular equality or moral balance that the offender's harmful
actions upset. 7 It ordinarily neglects the more remote victims of
the offender's criminal conduct and thus overlooks the more
remote harms caused by that conduct."
III. RETRIBUTION IN PRACTICE

While the principle of retribution is something often debated
among philosophers and legal scholars, retributivism also has
practical applications. Retributivism is central to criminal
sentencing and has generally served as a principal factor in
sentencing for the past few decades." Yet courts' retribution
analyses, like those of legal scholars, have neglected to examine
the more remote harms of criminal activities that remain
pervasive in our communities.
A. Retribution in the Courts
Much more than fodder for legal scholars, the principle of
retribution has played a major role in criminal sentencing.'00 In
96.
See Fletcher, The Place of Victims, supra note 95, at 60-63; see also MacLeod, supra
note 62, at 40 (explaining Fletchers view that, "once a community assumes the responsibility
to punish, it must punish all wrongdoers, including those who harm no victims, so that it does
not violate the norm of equal treatment"). Professor MacLeod explains that "[t]his conception
flips the Blackstonian model on its head. Whereas in Blackstone's view the victim's interest is
subsumed within the interest of the community, in Fletcher's view the state's obligation to
punish usurpers follows from its prior commitment to vindicate offenses against particular
victims." MacLeod, supra note 62, at 40. Professor Michael Moore suggests that Fletcher's
views are incompatible with retributivism and instead places Fletcher in the corrective justice
camp. See Michael Moore, Victims and Retribution:A Reply to Professor Fletcher, 3 BUFF.
CRIM. L. REV. 65, 75-77 (1999); see also MacLeod, supra note 62, at 42 (relating this
disagreement between Fletcher and Moore). According to Professor MacLeod, "Moore doubts
that equality and proportionality will persist in retributive punishment if that punishment is
left to the discretion of individual victims ... [aind he finds unpersuasive the notion that a
wrongdoer's culpability can be relative to the victim's desire to see the wrongdoer suffer."
MacLeod, supra note 62, at 42 (footnote omitted).
97.
See id.
98.
See id. at 40 (describing victim-centric retributivism as a focus on vindicating
the interests of direct victims, rather than broad communal interests).
See Sanford H. Kadish, Fifty Years of Criminal Law: An OpinionatedReview, 87
99.
CALIF. L. REV. 943, 978-81 (1999); Ristroph, supra note 1, at 1306 (describing how
retribution has recently gained wide approval as a principal factor in modern sentencing).
100.
See Ristroph, supra note 1, at 1306 ("Retribution . .. is central to modern
sentencing."). But cf Marc Miller, Purposes at Sentencing, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 413, 414
(1992) (asserting that the imposition of sentences is often "driven not by theoretical
justifications but by political concerns").
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determining the appropriate sentences for criminal offenders,
judges"o' consult the purposes of punishment authorized by
statutory law, and even when those statutes are only
consequentialist in nature, 102 courts interpret them to include the
purpose of retribution.o' In the case of United States v. Bergman,'0 4
0
for example, U.S. District Court Judge Marvin Frankelo'
relied in
part on retribution in sentencing a rabbi-philanthropist, convicted
of Medicare and tax fraud, to four months' imprisonment.' 6 He
explained that, "as is known to anyone who talks to judges,
lawyers, defendants, or people generally," just deserts is a factor
in sentence determination.1o7 Similarly, in the sentencing of
Michael Milken-a well-known American financier and
philanthropist who pleaded guilty to violations of federal
securities and tax laws-U.S. District Court Judge Kimba Wood
partially rooted her sentencing decision in retribution.' 8 She
101.
Although judges are responsible for sentencing criminal offenders in most
jurisdictions, some jurisdictions charge the jury with this responsibility. See Dhammika
Dharmapala, Nuno Garoupa & Joanna Shepherd, Legislatures, Judges, and Parole
Boards: The Allocation of Discretion Under Determinate Sentencing, 62 FLA. L. REV.
1037, 1066 (2010).
102.
See supra text accompanying notes 23-28 (explaining how consequentialist
theories of punishment replaced retributivist ones in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries).
103.
See Cotton, supra note 8, at 1316-17 & n.8; supra text accompanying notes
31-39.
104. United States v. Bergman, 416 F. Supp. 496 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
105. Judge Frankel was a central figure in the fall of rehabilitation in the mid-1970s
and the construction of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. MARVIN E. FRANKEL,
CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER 124 (1972).

106.
See Bergman, 416 F. Supp. at 497-98, 500. New York law at that time provided
that one of the general purposes of the Penal Law was "[t]o insure the public safety by
preventing the commission of offenses through the deterrent influence of the sentences
authorized, the rehabilitation of those convicted and their confinement when required in
the interests of public protection." N.Y. PENAL LAW § 1.05(5) (McKinney 1965) (current
version at N.Y. Penal Law § 1.05(6) (McKinney 2009)).
107. Bergman, 416 F. Supp. at 500. In Bergman, Judge Frankel did seem to doubt
the prevalence and acceptability of retribution among sentencing purposes, but this is
likely a product of the time during which the case was decided-at the lowest ebb of
retributivism. See id.; supra text accompanying notes 23-28 (describing a time during the
late nineteenth century and earliest part of the twentieth century when consequentialist
theories of punishment had replaced retributivist ones).
108. United States v. Milken, No. (S) 89Cr.41(KMW), 1990 WL 264699, at *3-7, *10
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 1990). By the time Milken was decided, the New York legislature had
amended the New York law governing the purposes of punishment. See N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 1.05 (McKinney 1982) (amended 2006). The law in effect when Milken was decided
included a possible, but vague, reference to the purpose of retribution. See N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 1.05(5) (McKinney 1982) (amended 2006). It provided that one of the
general purposes of the Penal Law was "[t]o provide for an appropriate public
response to particular offenses, including consideration of the consequences of the
offense for the victim, including the victim's family, and the community." Id.
Although both the Milken example and the Bergman example come out of the
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stated that an imprisonment term of ten years would "further the
goals of punishment and retribution."'o
Not only do sentencers regularly rely on retribution in
sentencing, but evidence suggests that sentencers' punishment
decisions may very well be primarily based on notions of
retribution."0 Judges may subscribe to a variety of theories in
sentencing,"' but the chiefly retributive basis of guidelines
sentencing schemes suggests that judges in many jurisdictions
are steered toward extensive reliance on the theory of retribution
in sentencing."2 Further, studies suggest that "most people consider
desert-based punishment to be the fundamental goal of criminal
law and intuitively respond to actual cases in desert-based
terms.""' It is possible that judges, who may have a more
Southern District of New York, judges across the country rely on retribution in
sentencing.
109. Milken, 1990 WL 264699, at *6-7. Considering judges' regular resort to retribution
in sentencing, it is not surprising that prosecutors often make retribution-based arguments to
sentencers. See, e.g., Harris v. State, 2 So. 3d 880, 924 (Ala. Crim. App. 2007) (stating that the
court has consistently held that "[rietribution is a proper subject of prosecutorial argument" to
the jury (internal quotation marks omitted)). Additionally, jurors are often instructed on the
proper purposes of punishment before being sent off to deliberate about a defendant's
appropriate sentence. See Cotton, supra note 8, at 1317. Further, during voir dire, lawyers
sometimes screen potential jurors based on the permissible purposes of punishment. See id.
110. See Kevin M. Carlsmith, John M. Darley & Paul H. Robinson, Why Do We
Punish? Deterrence and Just Deserts as Motives for Punishment, 83 J. PERSONALITY

& SOC. PSYCHOL. 284, 295-97 (2002) (finding that laymen's impositions of punishment
were motivated primarily by "just deserts"); John M. Darley, Kevin M. Carlsmith & Paul
H. Robinson, Incapacitationand Just Deserts as Motives for Punishment, 24 LAW & HUM.

BEHAV. 659, 676 (2000).
111. See Stephanos Bibas, Max M. Schanzenbach & Emerson H. Tiller, Policing
Politics at Sentencing, 103 Nw. U. L. REV. 1371, 1377 & n.24 (2009) (asserting that
"Uludges' sentencing philosophies vary" and that "[tlhese philosophies ... correlate with
widely divergent sentences").
See Paul J. Hofer, Immediate and Long-Term Effects of United States v.
112.
Booker: More Discretion, More Disparity,or Better Reasoned Sentences?, 38 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
425, 459-60 (2006) (asserting that most, if not all, guidelines systems are based on a form

of retributivism-more specifically, limiting retributivism); cf Christopher Slobogin,
Introduction to the Symposium on the Model Penal Code's Sentencing Proposals, 61 FLA.
L. REV. 665, 677-79, 681-82 (2009) (noting that a number of scholars agree that the
American Law Institute's proposed revisions to the sentencing provisions of the Model
Penal Code are based primarily on a theory of retribution). Although guidelines schemes
may be advisory in nature, see, e.g., United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005)

(severing the provision of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines that made them mandatory,
thus "mak[ing] the Guidelines effectively advisory"), they are still often a starting point
for judicial determinations of punishment, see, e.g., Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49
(2007).
Michael T. Cahill, Retributive Justice in the Real World, 85 WASH. U. L. REV.
113.
815, 823-24 & n.25 (2007); see also John M. Darley, Citizens'Assignmentsof Punishments
for Moral Transgressions:A Case Study in the Psychology of Punishment, 8 OHIO ST. J.
CRIM. L. 101, 106, 116 (2010) (explaining that "people's intuitive responses to wrongdoing
are primarily driven by retributive considerations" and concluding that "a 'natural
response' to moral norm violation is punishment generated for retaliatory purposes");
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reasoned approach to sentencing, can overcome this intuitive
response and appeal to other justifications for punishment in
sentencing."4 However, for seasoned sentencers, like many
judges, their experiences of routinely sentencing criminal
offenders may have transformed their reasoned sentencing
responses into intuitive responses, which are, again, most often
retributive in nature."' Moreover, even sentencers who maintain
reasoned, as opposed to intuitive, responses to sentencing
scenarios may still be primarily drawn to retributive punishment
goals because the current prevalence of retribution in the
American sentencing milieu. may have conditioned them to
retribution-based sentencing."' Accordingly, retribution is
important to modern-day sentencing decisions.
B. Courts' Neglect of More Remote Harms in Sentencing
Since retribution reemerged as a primary justification for
punishment around the mid-1970s,"' courts, like legal scholars,
have primarily limited their retribution analyses to the most
direct harms caused by the relevant criminal violations rather
than also including the broader societal impacts of criminal
activity."' Gradually, however, in a handful of cases, some courts
Hofer, supra note 112, at 460 ("Psychological research has consistently shown, for
example, that people are sensitive to factors associated with just deserts when making
sentencing decisions and relatively insensitive to factors associated with deterrence
theory."). However, scholars have noted that "[t]he difference between elite and popular
conceptions of desert is stark." Ristroph, supra note 1, at 1318; see Youngjae Lee,
Recidivism as Omission: A Relational Account, 87 TEx. L. REV. 571, 576 & n.17 (2009)
(questioning whether the desert "theorists" or "the people" should revise their views when
"a popular belief about a question of desert does not match up with conclusions arrived at
through theorizing and reflecting about desert").
114.
See Darley, supra note 113, at 113 (suggesting that one might expect judges "to
have developed a carefully thought-through and consciously-reasoned approach to
assigning punishments").
115.
See id. at 114-15 (explaining that "many decisions, repetitively made, move toward
being made more intuitively" and that this phenomenon may apply to judicial sentencers).
116.
See supra text accompanying notes 40-41 and Part III.A.
117.
See Darley, supra note 113, at 115-16 (suggesting that individuals may be
conditioned to appeal to one purpose of punishment over another, resulting in "a reasoned
override" of a punishment intuition). But cf Ryan W. Scott, Inter-Judge Sentencing
Disparity After Booker: A First Look, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1, 42-43, 45-46 (2010) (doubting
that "inertia" has kept post-Booker sentencing disparities minimal but acknowledging
that the cognitive bias of "anchoring" may be at least partially responsible).
118.
See supra text accompanying notes 29-41.
119.
Somewhat surprisingly, there is very little scholarly literature clearly
examining what harms U.S. courts have considered throughout history in determining
the appropriate sentences to impose on criminal offenders. This could stem either from
scholars' relative disinterest in the topic of sentencing until around the 1960s; judges'
historical neglect to explain their reasoning for imposing particular sentences; or the fact
that, in jurisdictions relying on parole boards to ultimately determine the duration of
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have expanded their analyses of harms to at least consider
injuries other than the most direct physical ones.120 In the 1984
case of State v. Phillips,121 for example, a Missouri court
determined that, in trying and sentencing a defendant, it was
appropriate to consider the victim's nervous breakdown and
continuing therapy following her brutal rape.'22 The court then
considered the psychological injuries that the victim suffered
as many as eight months after the criminal conduct occurred. 22
Not only was the court considering a more remote type of
injury-psychological instead of physical-but it was also
considering harms that took place much later in time than the
original criminal offense.'
In guidelines systems, judges rarely account for the more
remote harms caused by criminal conduct because they are
ordinarily encouraged to abide by certain pre-set sentences, or
narrow sentencing ranges, for particular offenses. 2' Oftentimes,
these sentences or narrow ranges are based not only on the
most direct harms caused by the offender's conduct, but also on
certain statutorily specified aggravating and mitigating factors
or on factors specified for use in guided departures from
suggested sentences.'26 These factors, however, ordinarily do
not take into account all of the more remote harms caused by
an offender's conduct. Instead, these factors are based on

imprisonment sentences, the particular sentences judges impose may have less
significance than they otherwise would.
Cf. Aya Gruber, A DistributiveTheory of Criminal Law, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV.
120.
1, 42 (2010) (noting the victim's rights movement's achievement of instituting victim
impact evidence at sentencing).
State v. Phillips, 670 S.W.2d 28 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984).
121.
See id. at 31-32. But see State v. Houx, 19 S.W. 35, 37 (Mo. 1892) (finding that
122.
the victim's physical condition three months after the offense "was too remote to throw
any light on the real issues in the case" but determining that the error in admitting this
evidence was harmless).
Phillips, 670 S.W.2d at 31.
123.
See id. at 31-32.
124.
Although sentencing disparities have increased somewhat after Booker and its
125.
progeny, the effect has been "modest." See Scott, supra note 117, at 18, 41; see also
William K Sessions III, At the Crossroads of the Three Branches: The U.S. Sentencing
Commission's Attempts to Achieve Sentencing Reform in the Midst of Inter-Branch Power
Struggles, 26 J.L. & POL. 305, 316, 329 (2011) ("With exceptions for child pornography and
crack cocaine sentences, the average length of imprisonment for all other offenses has
remained relatively constant over the past ten years, despite Booker and its
progeny."). According to one study, "[w]ithin-range and government-sponsored
sentences continue to account for more than 80% of sentences in the federal system."
Scott, supra note 117, at 18.
See Frase, supra note 61, at 79 (noting that, in a determinate sentencing
126.
system, the legislature "specifie[s] a narrow sentencing range for each offense, with minor
adjustments for aggravating and mitigating circumstances").

1074

HOUSTON LAW REVIEW

[48:5

things such as the victim's role in the offense,127 the offender's
lack of capacity,128 the victim's vulnerability,"' and any
particular cruelty involved in the offense.20 For example, under
the "adjustment" structure of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines,
judges,' in shaping a defendant's sentence, may take into

127. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4716(c)(1)(A) (2007) (providing that a downward
departure may be permissible if "[tihe victim was an aggressor or participant in the
criminal conduct associated with the crime of conviction"); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 244 app.
§ I1.D(2)(a)(1) (West 2010) (providing that, if "[tihe victim was an aggressor in the
incident," the judge may use this as a factor to justify departure from the presumptive
sentence); WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.535(1)(a) (2010) ("The court may impose an
exceptional sentence below the standard range if it finds that ... [tihe victim was an
initiator, willing participant, aggressor, or provoker of the incident.").
128. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4716(c)(1)(C) (2007) (providing that a downward
departure may be permissible if "[tihe offender, because of physical or mental
impairment, lacked substantial capacity for judgment when the offense was committed");
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 244 app. § II.D(2)(a)(3) (West 2010) (providing that a permissible
mitigating factor for departure is the offender's lack of "substantial capacity for judgment
when the offense was committed" due to "physical or mental impairment"); WASH. REV.
CODE § 9.94A.535(1)(e) (2010) ("The court may impose an exceptional sentence below the
standard range if it finds that . . . [tihe defendant's capacity to appreciate the
wrongfulness of his or her conduct, or to conform his or her conduct to the requirements of
the law, was significantly impaired.").
129. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4716(C)(2)(A) (2007) (providing that an upward
departure may be permissible if "[tihe victim was particularly vulnerable due to age,
infirmity, or reduced physical or mental capacity which was known or should have been known
to the offender"); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 244 app. § II.D(2)(b)(1) (West 2010) (providing that an
upward departure may be justified if "[the victim was particularly vulnerable due to age,
infirmity, or reduced physical or mental capacity, which was known or should have been
known to the offender"); WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.535(3)(b) (2010) (providing that a jury
determination that "[tihe defendant knew or should have known that the victim of the
current offense was particularly vulnerable or incapable of resistance" may justify "a
sentence above the standard range").
130.
See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4716(C)(2)(B) (2007) (providing that an upward
departure may be justified if "[tihe defendant's conduct during the commission of the
current offense manifested excessive brutality to the victim in a manner not normally
present in that offense"); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 244 app. § II.D(2)(b)(2) (West 2010)
(providing that an upward departure may be justified if "[tihe victim was treated with
particular cruelty for which the individual offender should be held responsible"); WASH.
REV. CODE § 9.94A.535(3)(a) (2010) (providing that a jury determination that "[tlhe
defendant's conduct during the commission of the current offense manifested deliberate
cruelty to the victim" may justify "a sentence above the standard range").
131.
In Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), the Court held that due process
and the Sixth Amendment require that, "[olther than the fact of a prior conviction, any
fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum
must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 490. In
Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), the Court built on this precedent, holding
that a mandatory sentencing range of a state guidelines sentencing scheme constitutes a
"prescribed statutory maximum," thus a judge increasing a sentence beyond the
guidelines range based on aggravating factors that the judge found based on a
preponderance of the evidence standard violated the Sixth Amendment. Id. at 301-04. In
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), the Court took the Blakely holding to its
logical conclusion by determining that the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, as they then
stood, were unconstitutional. See id. at 243-44. To remedy the problem, though, the Court
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account"' whether "the defendant knew or should have known
that a victim of the offense was a vulnerable victim"" or whether
the offense constituted a hate crime l34tWO circumstances that
warrant an upward adjustment." Further, the Guidelines also
provide for departures from the suggested sentencing ranges
when, for example, "the defendant committed the offense while
suffering from a significantly reduced mental capacity ... [that]
contributed substantially to the commission of the offense"; 136
"the victim's wrongful conduct contributed significantly to
provoking the offense behavior";3 m or "the defendant's conduct
was unusually heinous, cruel, brutal, or degrading to the
victim." 3 s In a number of guidelines sentencing schemes,
sentencers may also depart from the prescribed sentence or
range based on aggravating or mitigating factors not specifically
identified in the guidelines. 3 9 Under most guidelines sentencing
schemes, though, judges are required to record their reasons for
departing from the suggested sentences when they do so.14

severed a provision of the Guidelines, rendering them advisory rather than mandatory in
nature, See id. at 245. After all, the Court concluded, it "ha[d] never doubted the authority
of a judge to exercise broad discretion in imposing a sentence within a statutory range."
Id. at 233.
132. Although the Federal Sentencing Guidelines were originally promulgated as
mandatory for district court judges, in United States v. Booker, the Court excised this
portion of the Guidelines to render them only advisory in nature. Booker, 543 U.S. at 245.
The Court did this to avoid striking down the Guidelines under the Fifth Amendment Due
Process Clause and the Sixth Amendment's notice and jury trial guarantees, which
require that, "[olther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the
penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a
jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt." Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 476, 490.
133.
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3A1.1(b)(1) (2010).
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3A1.1(a) (2010).
134.
See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3A1.1(a)-(b)(1) (2010).
135.
136.
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.13 (2010).
137.
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.10 (2010).
138. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.8 (2010).
139.
See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4716(C)(1) & (2) (2007) (providing "nonexclusive"
lists of aggravating and mitigating factors); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 244 app. § IL.D(2) (West
2010) (providing a "nonexclusive list of factors which may be used as reasons for
departure"); WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.535(1) & (3) (2010) (noting that the enumerated
mitigating circumstances "are not intended to be exclusive reasons for exceptional
sentences" but providing that the enumerated list of aggravating circumstances to be
considered by a jury is exclusive); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.0(a)(2)(B)
(2010) ("A departure may be warranted in the exceptional case in which there is present a

circumstance that the Commission has not identified in the guidelines but that
nevertheless is relevant to determining the appropriate sentence.").

140.

See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL

§ 5K2.0(e) (2010) ("If the

court departs from the applicable guidelines range, it shall state . . . its specific
reasons for departure. . . ."). See generally Judy Ann Clausen, "Your Honor, May I

Have That in Writing?"A Proposed Response to Violations of the Federal Sentencing
Written Reasons Requirement, 42 U. TOL. L. REV. 705 (2011) (exploring circuit splits
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Rarely, it seems, have these recorded reasons for departure been
based on the more remote harms that the offender's conduct
causes, such as how the offender's trial has affected testifying
witnesses.
While courts ordinarily neglect addressing many of the
remote harms flowing from criminal conduct,'4 1 a handful of
courts have distinguished between some immediate and more
remote harms in the context of determining what constitutes a
"victim" under the language of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines.'42 For example, in United States v. Zats,143 the Third
Circuit was faced with the question of whether the vulnerable
victim adjustment of the Guidelines should apply to harmed
individuals who were not the direct victims of the charged
offenses.'" In that case, the defendant was a debt collector who
employed coercive and illegal methods in attempting to collect
debts."' The defendant also routinely failed to turn over the
collected funds to his clients, the creditors.1' The defendant
pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit mail and wire fraud,
regarding how stringently appellate courts must judge the written reasoning
requirement).
141. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
142.

See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANuAL

§ 3A1.1(b)(1)

(2010) (providing

that the base offense level should be increased by two levels "[i]f the defendant knew or
should have known that a victim of the offense was a vulnerable victim"). Moreover, in
discussing the statutory guidance to provide to the Sentencing Commission, the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary stated that the Commission might examine "whether the
offense was committed in a manner plainly designed to limit the danger to the victims." S.
REP. No. 98-225, at 170 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3353. The statute
ultimately vesting authority in the Sentencing Commission did direct the Commission to
consider whether "the nature and degree of the harm caused by the offense," as well as
"the community view of the gravity of the offense," and "the public concern generated by
the offense" were relevant to an offender's punishment. 28 U.S.C. § 994(c)(3)-(5) (2006).
However, the Commission appears to have addressed these concerns related to the harms
caused by criminal conduct, if at all, in a somewhat indirect manner. Aside from providing
for sentence modifications focused on matters other than the more remote harms caused
by criminal conduct, see supra text accompanying notes 131-39, the Commission seemed
to address these concerns of harms by adopting a real-offense, rather than a charge-based
offense, approach to determining an offender's baseline punishment range, see Doug
Keller, Why the Prior Conviction Sentencing Enhancements in Illegal Re-Entry Cases Are
Unjust and Unjustified (and Unreasonable Too), 51 B.C. L. REv. 719, 726 (2010), and

researching, but failing to implement, community views on particular crimes, see Carissa
Byrne Hessick, PrioritizingPolicy Before PracticeAfter Booker, 18 FED. SENT'G REP. 167,

167 (2006). Ultimately, though, it seems that the Guidelines still focus on only the most
direct harms caused by an offender's criminal conduct.
143. United States v. Zats, 298 F.3d 182 (3d Cir. 2002).
144. Id. at 184-87. Although the Federal Guidelines base sentences on "real"
offenses, as opposed to "charge" offenses, these individuals who were allegedly vulnerable
were not the most direct victims under either definition. See id. at 187.
145. Id. at 184.
146. Id.
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thus his clients-the individuals he defrauded of the collected
debts-were the direct victims of the offenses at issue.' The
clients were not considered vulnerable, but the debtors that the
defendant coerced were.'48 Examining the language of the
Guidelines, the court determined that the identity of the victim
should be read broadly and that courts may take into account all
of the conduct underlying the offense of conviction in determining
whether a sentencing enhancement applies."' Accordingly, the
court determined that the vulnerable victim enhancement was
appropriate in the case."o In United States v. Hoyungowa,"'
however, the Ninth Circuit found that the "extreme psychological
injury" suffered by a murder victim's family was not a ground on
which to base an upward departure under the Guidelines.'52 The
court explained that the departure guideline for extreme
psychological injury "applies . .. only to the direct victim of the

crime and not to others affected by the crime.""' It was concerned
that providing an upward departure on this ground "would
punish the murderer of the head of a household more harshly
than the murderer of a transient."5
147. Id. The defendant also pleaded guilty to a tax offense in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 371 and to attempted tax evasion in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7201. Id.
148. See id. at 186-90.
149. See id. at 186-87. The court stated that "victim status is not limited to those
hurt by the offense of conviction, but also includes those hurt by relevant conduct outside
that offense." Id. at 187. Thus, this broader conception of a victim under the Guidelines is
linked to the Guidelines' determination that sentences should be based not only on the
crime of conviction but also the defendant's "relevant conduct." See U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.3(a)(1)(A), (a)(3) (2010) (stating that sentences shall be based
upon "all acts and omissions committed, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced,
procured, or willfully caused by the defendant" and "all harm that resulted from the[se]
acts and omissions").
150. Zats, 298 F.3d at 187; see also, e.g., United States v. Kennedy, 554 F.3d 415, 424 (3d
Cir. 2009) (quoting Zats for the same proposition); United States v. Moon, 513 F.3d 527, 541
(6th Cir. 2008) (noting that the vulnerable victim adjustment may be based on the victims of
the defendant's "relevant conduct"); United States v. Bolden, 325 F.3d 471, 500 (4th Cir. 2003)
("In order to apply the vulnerable victim adjustment, a sentencing court must identify the
victims of the ... [defendants] relevant conduct."); United States v. Johnson, 297 F.3d 845, 873
(9th Cir. 2002) (explaining that the vulnerable victim enhancement "applies whenever the
offense of conviction involved 'relevant conduct' that victimized a person that the defendant
knew or should have known was vulnerable" (citation omitted)).
151. United States v. Hoyungowa, 930 F.2d 744 (9th Cir. 1991).
152. Id. at 747 (internal quotation marks omitted).
153. Id. In United States v. Alber, 56 F.3d 1106, 1112 (9th Cir. 1995), though, the
Ninth Circuit concluded that while an upward departure based on "extreme psychological
injury" applies only when that harm is suffered by the direct victim, a court may depart
upward based on extreme psychological injuries to remote victims because this is a
"circumstance of a kind or to a degree the Sentencing Commission did not adequately take
into account when formulating the Guidelines."
154. Hoyungowa, 930 F.2d at 747. For a discussion of this concern about ranking
victims, see infra text accompanying notes 260-66.
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In contrast to the direction judges receive under guidelines
sentencing schemes, under nonguidelines sentencing schemes,
judges usually have little guidance in terms of what sentence an
offender deserves to receive."' Further, in these sentencing
jurisdictions, it is rare that judges explain why they impose the
sentences that they do."' Accordingly, it is difficult to determine
what specific factors judges take into account in setting sentences
in these jurisdictions, but it seems unlikely that they take into
account all of the harms that offenders' criminal conduct cause
because there appears to be little discussion of such remote
harms in sentencing decisions.
The Supreme Court has recently implied that some of the
more remote harms of criminal conduct should indeed be
considered in sentencing.1 7 In its Eighth Amendment case of
Kennedy v. Louisiana,"' the Court evaluated whether the
punishment of death is constitutional for the crime of child rape
and concluded that the relevant harms to be considered extend
beyond the most direct harms of the child rape victim's suffering

155.

See Steven L. Chanenson, The Next Era of Sentencing Reform, 54 EMORY L.J.

377, 381-86 (2005). Note, however, that nonguidelines and indeterminate sentencing are
ordinarily associated with consequentialist, rather than retributivist, theories of
punishment. See Cotton, supra note 8, at 1360; Kyron Huigens, What Is and Is Not
Pathological in CriminalLaw, 101 MICH. L. REV. 811,818 (2002); Erik Luna, Punishment
Theory, Holism, and the ProceduralConception of Restorative Justice, 2003 UTAH L. REV.

205,252.
See Robert Batey & Stephen M. Everhart, The Appeal Provision of Florida's
156.
CriminalPunishment Code: Unwise and Unconstitutional,11 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 5,

13 n.48 (1999) (explaining that, in Florida's indeterminate sentencing system of times
past, "there was no requirement for the judge to give any reason for handing down a
harsh sentence, as long as the sentence was below the maximum provided by law");
D. Michael Fisher, Changing Pennsylvania's Sentencing Philosophy Through the
Eliminationof Parolefor Violent Offenders, 5 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 269, 274 (1996) ("Under

indeterminate systems, judges had discretion in determining the length of the sentence
imposed and did not have to explain their sentencing decisions."); Nancy Gertner,
Circumventing Juries, Undermining Justice: Lessons from Criminal Trials and
Sentencing, 32 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 419, 439 (1999) (noting that a common criticism of

indeterminate sentencing is that judges fail to explain their reasons for the sentences
imposed); Nancy J. King & Michael E. O'Neill, Appeal Waivers and the Future of

Sentencing Policy, 55 DUKE L.J. 209, 213 (2005) ("Previously, under indeterminate
sentencing, federal trial judges rarely spelled out factual findings or gave reasons for their
sentences."); Kevin R. Reitz, Sentencing Facts: Travesties of Real-Offense Sentencing, 45

STAN. L. REV. 523, 572 (1993) (noting that, in indeterminate sentencing systems, "courts
seldom explain their decisions and are rarely reviewed").
157. This is not to suggest that Kennedy should be interpreted as providing a
necessary formula for punishment justifications that state legislatures and courts must
follow in all circumstances. Cf. supra text accompanying notes 36-39 (explaining how
some courts have mistakenly cited the Supreme Court case of Gregg v. Georgia as
requiring states to adopt retributive punishment rationales).
158. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 418 (2008).
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as a result of the rape.159 After stating that retribution "reflects
society's and the victim's interests""'o and determining that the
retribution inquiry "must include the question whether the
[punishment] balances the wrong to the victim,""' the Court
described some of the more remote harms caused by a child
rapist's conduct:
Capital cases require a long-term commitment by those who
testify for the prosecution, especially when guilt and
sentencing determinations are in multiple proceedings. In
cases like this the key testimony is not just from the family
but from the victim herself. During formative years of her
adolescence, made all the more daunting for having to come
to terms with the brutality of her experience, [the child
rape victim] was required to discuss the case at length with
law enforcement personnel. In a public trial she was
required to recount once more all the details of the crime to
a jury as the State pursued the death of her stepfather[, the
offender].16

The Court then concluded that these harms were relevant to
a determination of the appropriate sentence to impose on the
offender.'6 3 Surprisingly, the Court did not conclude that this
additional suffering justified imposing a harsher punishment on
the offender, however. Instead, the Court stated that "[iut is not
at all evident that the child rape victim's hurt is lessened when
the law permits the death of the perpetrator."'6 4 It then concluded
that a more lenient punishment was appropriate because it
would help alleviate the child victim's suffering by requiring a
lesser testifying commitment by the child victim and thus
"balance [] the wrong to the victim."' 6 '
Despite the Court's suggestion that these more remote
harms are relevant to sentencing, lower courts and scholars have
not seemed to recognize the significance of the Kennedy Court's
novel retributive analysis.'66 Although numerous courts, scholars,

159.
See id. at 441-46.
160.
Id. at 442; Cf supra text accompanying notes 45-53 (describing the theories of
protective retributivism and victim vindication).
Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 442.
161.
162. Id. at 442-43.
163.
See id. at 442-43, 446.
164.
Id. at 442.
165.
See id. at 442-43, 446-47.
See supra text accompanying notes 158-63 (explaining the Kennedy Court's
166.
suggestion that more remote harms are relevant to sentencing); supra note 157; infra text
accompanying notes 167-70 (providing examples of lower courts and scholars that have
failed to recognize the Kennedy Court's atypical analysis).
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and practitioners have cited the case as binding precedent, they
have cited it for propositions such as that the death penalty may
be imposed only for crimes that result in the victim's death,'67
that children's testimony in death penalty cases is potentially
unreliable,'" and that the sexual abuse of children leads to
significant harms."' They have seemed to overlook what is one of
the most important facets of the Court's reasoning in the case: its
expansion of the traditional harms considered under a theory of
retribution.o
Aside from the Supreme Court's allusion to the more remote
harms caused by an offender's criminal conduct, victim impact
evidence is usually the only source of information that sentencers
might actually expressly consider regarding the more remote
harms that an offender's conduct causes.7 However, most
jurisdictions have provided little guidance as to the nature of the
evidence that may be admitted in such sentencing proceedings. 7 2
In guidelines systems, especially, in which sentencers are
explicitly directed to consider certain factors in setting sentences
but not explicitly encouraged to consider the more remote harms
caused by an offender's criminal conduct, it remains unclear
whether sentencers do indeed consider these more remote

167. See, e.g., Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2022 (2010) ("[Tlhe Court has
concluded that capital punishment is impermissible for nonhomicide crimes against
individuals." (citing Kennedy, 554 U.S. 407)); United States v. Caro, 597 F.3d 608, 638
(4th Cir. 2010) (citing Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 447). While the Kennedy Court stated that
this proposition is true with respect to crimes against the individual, it suggested that the
punishment of death could be properly imposed for crimes such as treason and kingpin
drug activity. See Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 437.
168. See Humphries v. Cnty. of L.A., 554 F.3d 1170, 1195 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting
Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 443); see also Miller v. Martel, No. CV 08-05075 CJC (RZ), 2009 WL
3122549, at *3 n.1 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 24, 2009) (citing Kennedy for the same proposition).
169. See United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1207 (11th Cir. 2010) ("Much has been said
to describe and emphasize the grave harm that sexual abuse of children inflicts on its victims.
Some of the best and most recent descriptions of that harm can be found in Kennedy...."
(citation omitted)); see also United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1974 (2010) (citing
Kennedy as an example of a case in which sexual abuse was demonstrated to be "a despicable
act with untold consequences for the victim personally and society generally").
170. See, e.g., Edward M. Fox II, Note, A Whisper to State Legislatures? The Potential
Irony of the Supreme Court's Decision in Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641 (2008), 88
NEB. L. REV. 832, 845-47 (2010) (relating the Court's retribution analysis and asserting
that it "broke no new ground").

171.

See Wayne A. Logan, Through the Past Darkly: A Survey of the Uses and Abuses of

Victim Impact Evidence in Capital Trials, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 143, 150, 153-56, 160-68 (1999)

(detailing various types of remote evidence admitted as victim impact evidence but explaining
how other remote evidence, such as "opinion" evidence related to the crime and appropriate
sentence, is generally limited); supra text accompanying notes 158-63 (explaining the Kennedy
Court's suggestion that more remote harms are relevant to sentencing).
172. Logan, supranote 171, at 162.

20121

PROXIMATE RETRIBUTION

1081

harms."' In nonguidelines systems, too, because judges often do
not provide any reasoning behind the sentences they impose, it
remains uncertain that the sentencers are influenced by evidence
of more remote harms. 74 Moreover, even when this controversial
evidence is admitted, studies suggest that such evidence has
little, if any, effect on sentencing decisions. For example, a 1994
study concluded that victim impact statements failed to increase
sentencers' serious consideration of the harms caused by
offenders' conduct and also did not result in harsher sentencing
decisions for offenders causing greater harms to victims. 75
Additionally, a 1999 study concluded that victim impact
statements have no significant effect on whether the death
penalty is imposed in capital cases.176 Further, studies have also
shown that "sentence severity has not increased following the
passage of [victim impact statement] legislation."'7 7 One scholar
has suggested that it seems like it is not victim impact evidence
that affects sentences but is instead the factor of what type of
victim was violated by the offender's conduct.'7 1 Professor George
Fletcher concludes that this makes sense; "[ilt would seem odd,"
he has mused, "that the determination of the death penalty," for

173. See supra text accompanying notes 125-40 (describing how guidelines systems
use specified factors for sentencing that ordinarily do not include remote harms and how
judges' recorded reasons for departing from the guidelines are often not based on remote
harms).
174. See supra text accompanying notes 155-56.
175.
See Robert C. Davis & Barbara E. Smith, The Effects of Victim Impact
Statements on Sentencing Decisions:A Test in an Urban Setting, 11 JUST. Q. 453, 462-65

(1994) (concluding that victim impact statements made little difference in sentencing
decisions).
176.

See Paul G. Cassell, Barbarians at the Gates? A Reply to the Critics of the

Victims' Rights Amendment, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 479, 491-92, app. B at 540-44; see also
Theodore Eisenberg, Stephen P. Garvey & Martin T. Wells, Victim Characteristicsand
Victim Impact Evidence in South CarolinaCapital Cases, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 306, 331-41

(2003) (finding no causal relation between the introduction of victim impact evidence and
sentencing outcomes). But see, e.g., Edith Greene, The Many Guises of Victim Impact
Evidence and Effects on Jurors' Judgments, 5 PSYCHOL. CRIME & L. 331, 334 (1999)

(discussing mock jury trials in which victim impact statements may have had some effect
on capital decisions).
177.
Edna Erez, Who's Afraid of the Big Bad Victim? Victim Impact Statements as
Victim Empowerment and Enhancement of Justice, CRIM. L. REV., July 1999, at 545, 547-48;
see also Paul G. Cassell, In Defense of Victim Impact Statements, 6 OHIo ST. J. CRIM. L.

611, 634, 636 (2009) ("Influencing the sentence, however, has never been an explicit
or implicit purpose of the [victim impact statement] legislation." (quoting Edna Erez,
Victim Voice, Impact Statements and Sentencing: IntegratingRestorative Justice and
Therapeutic Jurisprudence Principles in Adversarial Proceedings, 40 CRIM. L. BULL.

483, 490 (2004))).
178.

See Fletcher, The Place of Victims, supra note 95, at 51, 55 ("But the sentiments

of the particular victims seem to me less important than the class of victims violated by
the particular offense.").
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example, "should depend on the general affection or hostility of
the [victim's] relatives." 79
C. The Existence of More Remote Harms
Retributivist courts' and theorists' neglect in examining in
any depth which particular harms an offender should be held
accountable for does not stem from an absence of these more
remote harms created by a criminal offender's conduct. In
addition to direct harms to victims, such as the victim's death
in a murder case or a victim's injury-whether financial,
physical, or mental-in an assault and battery case, offenders'
conduct may cause harms to other members of society.8 o
Friends and family of the most direct victim may suffer
emotionally, or even financially, as a result of the victim's
injury.' A business may suffer from losing the knowledge and
productivity of one of its employees and may be further
harmed by its responsibility for paying part of the employee's
medical costs.182 Even strangers who identify with the most
direct victim may suffer emotionally, and criminal offenses
also stir up general fear among other members of society."'
Further, crime in a community may upset local norms about

moral behavior. 184
Individuals are also sometimes harmed by participating at
an offender's trial. While some direct victims find testifying
against an offender empowering, other direct victims suffer
immensely as a result of testifying.'"' Studies show that child
victim witnesses, especially, often suffer psychological harms
when they are forced to testify against their victimizers.'8 6 This
has led a number of states to enact legislation designed to
protect child victim testifiers by, for example, allowing child
testimony to be presented by videotape,"' allowing children to

179.
Id. at 51.
180.
See Kenworthey Bilz & John M. Darley, What's Wrong with Harmless Theories
of Punishment, 79 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1215, 1233-36 (2004).
181.
Id. at 1235.
182.
See id. at 1234-35.
183.
Id. at 1235.
184. Id. at 1236.
See Jessica Liebergott Hamblen & Murray Levine, The Legal Implications and
185.

Emotional Consequences of Sexually Abused Children Testifying as Victim-Witnesses, 21
LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 139, 157-58 (1997).
186. Id. at 170-71.
187.
See Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 853 & n.2 (1990) (listing the thirty-seven
states that permit videotaped testimony of sexually abused children).
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testify via closed-circuit television,"' or providing the judge with
discretion to close the courtroom when a child is testifying.8 9
Testifiers who were not direct victims may also be harmed
when they are compelled to testify at trial.9 o These more
remote victims of the offender's criminal conduct may suffer
from spending time away from their homes or work to testify
and from being exposed to what are often the gruesome details
191
*
of afcrime.
Criminal activity also takes a toll on communities.
According to the "broken windows" theory, an offender's
criminal conduct could encourage further criminal activity in
the community.'92 This increase in crime could cause some
community members to flee the area, cause other residents to
become less neighborly, and cause most residents to stay off
the streets after dark.' It could even cause residents to
become suspicious of one another, which may lead to behaviors
that seem racist or otherwise discriminatory in nature.'9 4 In
essence, an offender's criminal activity can change the
character of a neighborhood. Further, increased crime often
leads to decreased property values and impels communities to
increase taxes to fund better police forces, additional
prosecutions, and an increasing number of criminal
188.
Id. at 853-54 & n.3.
Ellen Forman, Note, To Keep the Balance True: The Case of Coy v. Iowa, 40
189.
HASTINGS L.J. 437,443 & n.5 (1989).
See Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 210 (1987) (emphasizing the
190.

importance of joint criminal trials because, if prosecutors were forced to bring
separate proceedings against each criminal defendant, there would be numerous
inefficiencies and fairness concerns, including that witnesses would have "to repeat
the inconvenience (and sometimes trauma) of testifying" in each of these
proceedings); Paul Marcus, Re-evaluating Large Multiple-Defendant Criminal
Prosecutions, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 67, 90 n.121 (2002) (noting that greater

convenience for witnesses is one of the "presumed efficienclies] of joint trials" and
that compelling lay witnesses to testify "certainly forces real burdens upon them,"
such as requiring them to be absent from home or work).
See Richardson, 481 U.S. at 210; Marcus, supra note 190, at 90 n.121.
191.
Bilz & Darley, supra note 180, at 1236; see also James Q. Wilson & George
192.
L. Kelling, Broken Windows, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Mar. 1982, at 29, 31 (describing

the "broken windows" theory). Some empiricists have questioned the reliability of the
"broken windows" theory, see, e.g., Jeffrey Fagan & Garth Davies, Street Stops and
Broken Windows: Terry, Race, and Disorderin New York City, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
457, 464-67 (2000) (summarizing the origin of the theory and some empirical doubts

that some scholars have raised about the theory), and some have explained how the
theory has been distorted by police departments policing in the name of the theory,
see, e.g., id. at 469-72.
193.
Bilz & Darley, supra note 180, at 1236.

194. See id. at 1237 ("[N]eighborhood watch groups can also take on vigilante, and
sometimes even racist, overtones-the creation of which must also be considered a harm
of crime.").
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punishments."' A 1999 study found that the annual public and
private prevention costs of crime in the United States-such as
city police forces and private security guards, as well as lost
productivity and other indirect economic costs of crime-amounted
to over $1 trillion.'
Crime can also cause institutions, such as the criminal
justice system, to lose credibility."' An increase in crime can
cause the public to lose faith in the police, and ineffective
prosecutions can cause people to lose faith in local prosecutors
and the system in general.'98 This loss of respect for the criminal
justice system can not only lead to crime victims and their
associates feeling like they have been victimized a second time,
but it can also lead to individuals' failures to comply with the
law.'99 This, in turn, can contribute to rising crime rates in a
community and feed into the "broken windows" theory.200
Not only do the immediate and more remote victims suffer
harms as a result of an offender's criminal activity, but the
offender, himself, also suffers. When apprehended, tried, and
convicted, an offender will most clearly suffer as a result of his
legally sanctioned punishment, whether that involves
probation, imprisonment, or even death.20' Prison is known to
harden criminals, which could also lead to higher crime rates
and perhaps more violent crime in the community.202 Aside
from offenders' punishments, though, some offenders suffer
guilt or distress as a result of committing their crimes.2
Moreover, they are often stigmatized, especially when
convicted.2 04

195.
See id. at 1235-37, 1240.
See David A. Anderson, The Aggregate Burden of Crime, 42 J.L. & ECON.
196.
611, 620-29 (1999) (estimating the annual cost of crime in the United States to
exceed $1 trillion).
197.
Bilz & Darley, supra note 180, at 1237-38.
198. Mary Holland Baker et al., The Impact of a Crime Wave: Perceptions, Fear,and
Confidence in the Police, 17 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 319, 319-21, 324-25, 330 (1983); Bilz &
Darley, supra note 180, at 1237-38.
199. Bilz & Darley, supra note 180, at 1237-38.
See id. at 1236-38; supra text accompanying notes 192-96. But see supra note
200.
192 (explaining that some scholars do not buy into the "broken windows" theory).
See Bilz & Darley, supra note 180, at 1238.
201.
See id.
202.
203.
See, e.g., id. at 1238 & n.83, 1239; Steven Stack, Homicide Followed by Suicide: An
Analysis of Chicago Data, 35 CRIvINOLOGY 435, 440-41, 449 (1997) (explaining how many
murderers are racked with guilt to the point of suicide after killing a "loved one"). One might
even consider the offender's pleasure gained as a result of his offense as a harm caused to the
offender himself. See Bilz & Darley, supra note 180, at 1239.
204. See Bilz & Darley, supra note 180, at 1238-39.
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Offenders' families, friends, and acquaintances are also
harmed as a result of the offenders' criminal activities. 20 5 This is
especially so if they depend on the offender either financially or
emotionally, and their harms will likely be magnified when the
punishment amounts to confinement or death.20 6 Research
suggests that families of offenders sentenced to death suffer from
"repeated nightmares, sleepless nights, difficulty concentrating,
impaired short-term memory, hypervigilance, a constant aching
grief, and episodes of uncontrollable crying." 20 Offenders'
families, friends, and acquaintances will also suffer the stigma
that accompanies their association with the offender. 20 ' Further,
they often expend significant resources to help the offender avoid
punishment.20 9 These harms, too, have been largely neglected in
analyses of retribution-based punishment.
IV. CONSIDERING THESE MORE REMOTE HARMS IS CONSISTENT
WITH HARM-BASED RETRIBUTION AND IS OTHERWISE BENEFICIAL

Accounting for these more remote harms that have generally
been overlooked by both courts and scholars would result in
sentences that better reflect an offender's desert, at least when
determining desert based upon a harm-based theory of
retribution-the variety of retribution upon which many
sentencing schemes are based.2 o Whether one adopts a theory of
protective retributivism or victim vindication from within a
harm-based framework, all of the harms an offender's conduct
causes, either to society or to the victim, respectively, are
theoretically relevant in determining such desert. Because
protective retributivists endeavor to restore balance to society
that the offender has disrupted by benefiting from the law but
failing to abide by it,2 1' effecting this equilibrium in society may
require that harms in addition to those most directly caused be
accounted for in sentencing the offender. Similarly, because
retributivists subscribing to the victim vindication variety of the
theory seek to balance the offender's and victims' dignities by
correcting the offender's misguided statement that his rights are

205.
See id. at 1239.
See id.
206.
Rachel King, No Due Process: How the Death Penalty Violates the Constitutional
207.
Rights of the Family Members ofDeath Row Prisoners,16 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 195, 209 (2007).
208.
See Bilz & Darley, supra note 180, at 1239.
Id.
209.
See supra text accompanying note 66.
210.
See supra text accompanying notes 46-49.
211.
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more important than his victims' rights,212 addressing the harms
caused to all of the offender's victims should arguably be
contemplated in sentencing under a harm-based theory.21 3
Accordingly, accounting for these more remote effects of the
offender's conduct often better reflects harm-based desert and is
truer to a harm-based retributive rationale for punishment.
Because accounting for this greater array of harms would
better reflect an individual offender's desert, doing so would allow
more equitable treatment of offenders in that an offender who
created greater harms would be punished more severely than an
offender who created lesser harms, even if both offenders committed
similar crimes.214 If a judge were to consider these harms in
determining the appropriate sentence to impose, this could perhaps
serve as a fair compromise between proponents of guidelines
systems and advocates of nonguidelines systems. While guidelines
systems are generally touted as minimizing sentencing disparities
among similarly situated offenders, nonguidelines systems provide
judges with greater flexibility to individualize offenders' sentences
215
to more closely match their crimes and personal circumstances.
Providing for further consideration of harms within a guidelines
system would provide judges with greater flexibility to match an
offender's sentence to his harm-based desert. And considering
additional harms within a nonguidelines system might nudge
judges to examine more closely an offender's sentence in relation to
the sentences of other offenders convicted of similar crimes and in
light of the harms caused by each such offense.
Considering more remote harms in sentencing could provide
other benefits as well. In addition to serving retributive goals that
are most embraced by today's sentencing schemes, recognizing
See supra text accompanying notes 50-53.
212.
Certainly, it may seem unfair to consider all of the harms flowing from a
213.
criminal offender's conduct. Accordingly, there should perhaps be a proximate causation
limitation imposed on the harms resulting from an offender's conduct. See infra Parts VVI (hypothesizing why accounting for remote harms is not the norm, but arguing for such
an accounting limited by a proximate causation construct).
In most jurisdictions, a defendant's sentence also depends somewhat on his
214.
criminal history. See Ahmed A. White, The Juridicial Structure of Habitual Offender
Laws and the Jurisprudenceof AuthoritarianSocial Control, 37 U. TOL. L. REV. 705, 705
(2006) (recognizing that enhancing criminal punishment because of the offender's
criminal past has "long been an important component of American sentencing policy"). In
that case, accounting for the more remote harms of sentencing could be more equitable to
a defendant who has committed the same category of offense as another offender, and has
a similar criminal history, but has caused fewer harms.
215. See generally Albert W. Alschuler, The Failureof Sentencing Guidelines: A Plea
for Less Aggregation, 58 U. Cm. L. REV. 901, 939-45 (1991) (explaining the trade-offs
between individualization in nonguidelines schemes and the reduction of sentencing
disparities in guidelines schemes).
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these other harms in sentencing might also serve deterrent
purposes, which are still important in today's sentencing systems.
Certainly, if a would-be offender is aware that his punishment for a
crime may be enhanced, that will increase the deterrence value of
the punishment. Further, if the offender considers that this
enhancement would be based on circumstances that could be, in
part, beyond his control, perhaps this will cause him even greater
pause before engaging in the criminal conduct. While increasing the
base value of an offense would likely also increase the deterrent
value of a punishment, such an action would fail the goal of
marginal deterrence.21 As Cesare Beccaria argued: "If an equal
punishment is laid down for two crimes which damage society
unequally, men will not have a stronger deterrent against
committing the greater crime if they find it more advantageous to
do so."217 This hazard can be avoided by instead increasing an
offender's punishment only when he causes greater harms.
Another benefit of accounting for more harms that an
offender causes in committing his offense is that this could
incentivize offenders to attempt to mitigate the harms flowing
from their criminal conduct. Similar incentives to mitigate are
important in other areas of law. In the torts context, for example,
a defendant may limit the extent of his liability by mitigating
the harms caused by his tortious conduct."'" The defendant
may thereby escape the extensive liability that would
otherwise result from the traditional tort rule that a defendant
is responsible for all of the harms resulting from his
intentional tortious conduct and for all of the harms
216.

See Neal Kumar Katyal, Deterrence's Difficulty, 95 MICH. L. REV. 2385, 2389

(1997) (explaining that the problem of marginal deterrence "is essentially the problem of
cliffs--exacting equal penalties for crimes of lesser and greater magnitude leads to crimes
of greater magnitude"). But cf Michael Tonry, The Mostly Unintended Effects of
Mandatory Penalties: Two Centuries of Consistent Findings, in 38 CRIME AND JUSTICE: A

REVIEW OF RESEARCH 65, 68-69 (Michael Tonry ed., 2009) (stating that "the marginal
deterrence hypothesis[-]that increases to previously applicable penalties will prevent
crimes by raising their prospective punitive cost"-has been supported by some, but
refuted by most, studies).
217.
CESARE BECCARIA, On Crimes and Punishments, in ON CRIMES AND
PUNISHMENTS AND OTHER WRITINGS 1, 21 (Richard Bellamy ed., Richard Davies, Virginia

Cox & Richard Bellamy trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1995) (1764).
218.

See Osborne M. Reynolds, Jr., TransferredIntent: Should Its "Curious Survival"

Continue?, 50 OKLA. L. REV. 529, 531 (1997) ("No limit of proximate causation is imposed
in the intentional tort situations, as it is in negligence .. . ."); John J. Walsh, Steven J.
Selby & Jodie L. Schaffer, Media Misbehaviorand the Wages of Sin: The Constitutionality
of ConsequentialDamages for Publication of Ill-Gotten Information, 4 WM. & MARY BILL

RTs. J. 1111, 1135 (1996) ("ll]n determining the issue of direct or proximate causation for
intentional torts, the courts implicitly or explicitly have adopted the general doctrine that
there is 'extended liability' for intentional torts, and thus the rules of proximate causation
are more liberally applied in [these] cases ... than in cases of mere negligence.").
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proximately caused by his negligent conduct.2 19 This same
incentive to mitigate would exist in the criminal context if a
sentencing court were to consider a broader array of harms
resulting from the offender's criminal conduct in determining
the appropriate sentence to impose.
Further, consistent with a victim vindication theory of
punishment, considering these more remote harms would
communicate with the offender and express to society in
general that the harmful effects of criminal conduct extend
beyond just the primary victims and are felt throughout
society.220 This could enforce moral norms within the
community, and highlighting these particular effects of crime
would likely resonate more deeply with the offender and other
members of society than, for example, generalizing that crime

is harmful to society. 221
V. SOME CONTEMPLATED DIFFICULTIES IN CONSIDERING MORE
REMOTE HARMS

Considering that accounting for these more remote harms
would better reflect an offender's harm-based desert and
provide other sentencing benefits, and considering that the
Supreme Court seems to have embraced the consideration of
some of the most remote harms in sentencing,2 22 the question arises
as to why courts and scholars ordinarily fail to take into account
these more remote harms in determining punishments. While few,
if any, courts or scholars have articulated why such remote harms
are regularly neglected in sentencing, there are several possibilities
as to why accounting for them is not the norm.
First, there is the concern that enhancing an offender's
sentence based upon consequences he may not have intended is
unjust and inconsistent with the basic requirement of mens rea

219.
Supra note 218. But see infra note 227. A torts plaintiff also has a duty to
mitigate his injuries, and if he fails to do so, the defendant responsible for the plaintiffs
initial injury will not be held responsible for the exacerbation of that injury resulting from
the plaintiffs failure to mitigate. 2 DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 510 (2d ed. 2000).
220. See supra text accompanying notes 46-53 (explaining the expressive and
communicative values of retribution that are encompassed within the victim
vindication variety of retributivism).
221. See Dena Cox & Anthony D. Cox, Communicating the Consequences of Early
Detection: The Role of Evidence and Framing, J. MARKETING, July 2001, at 91, 91-92
(explaining that "research suggests that audiences tend to be more interested in and
influenced by anecdotal than statistical evidence" and that "many subjects seem to 'tune
out' abstract generalizations").
222. See supra text accompanying notes 158-65 (discussing the Court's accounting
for more remote harms in Kennedy).
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2
in criminal law.m
, Certainly, mens rea is of utmost concern in
determining whether a defendant may be held criminally
liable.224 Yet mens rea is sometimes irrelevant in determining
criminal liability, such as when an offender may be held
criminally liable for the quite serious crime of statutory rape
even though he is unaware that the individual with whom he had
sexual intercourse was underage. 2 25 Further, mens rea has also
been considered unnecessary in applying some sentencing
enhancements. For example, under the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, an offender may receive a sentence enhancement for
discharging a gun even though this was an unintentional
action.22 6 Moreover, in the torts context, intentional tortfeasors
are held liable for all 227 of the consequences flowing from their
tortious conduct, regardless of whether they intended those
results.2 28 The breadth of this potential liability stems from the
greater culpability attributed to intentional, rather than
unintentional, tortfeasors. 2 9 One might argue that, because
criminal conduct is even more egregious than an intentional tort,
a criminal offender should be held criminally liable to an even
greater extent. However, more is at stake for the criminal

223.
See DRESSLER, supra note 94, at 117-19 ("[The mens rea requirement ... is
founded on the belief that it is morally unjust to punish those who accidentally, rather
than by choice, cause social injury.").
224.
See id. at 117 (stating that criminal liability requires proof of mens rea).
225.
See Assaf Hamdani, Mens Rea and the Cost of Ignorance, 93 VA. L. REV. 415,
438 (2007) ("Statutory rape is perhaps the most controversial example of a strict-liability
crime.").
226.
See Dean v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1849, 1855 (2009) (stating that, while "[ilt
is unusual to impose criminal punishment for the consequences of purely accidental
conduct . .. lilt is not unusual to punish individuals for the unintended consequences of
their unlawful acts").
227.
Some courts limit the harms for which the intentional tortfeasor is liable by a
proximate causation limitation that is often more flexible than the proximate causation
limitation seen in the context of negligence. See James R. MacAyeal, The Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act: The Correct Paradigmof Strict
Liability and the Problem of Individual Causation, 18 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 217,
233-34 (2000).
228.
See 2 DOBBS, supra note 219, at 54 (stating that, for example, "[olnce a
battery is established, the defendant becomes liable for the harms resulting,
including unintended ones"); see also Tate v. Canonica, 5 Cal. Rptr. 28, 33 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1960) ("The law has for a long time recognized a distinction between intentional
and negligent torts, and has generally . .. been more inclined to find that defendant's
conduct was the legal cause of the harm complained of, where the tort is
intentional."); R.D. v. W.H., 875 P.2d 26, 30-31 (Wyo. 1994) (noting that "courts have
recognized that a higher degree of responsibility should be imposed upon tort-feasors
whose conduct was intentional than upon those whose conduct was merely negligent"
and adopting this approach).
229.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL
HARM § 33 (2010).
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offender because criminal punishment can possibly result in
incarceration or even death, whereas tort law remedies usually
reside in the realm of monetary damages. Ultimately, this mens rea
concern is congruent with the problem of moral luck that has led
many scholars to reject harm-based retribution as a legitimate basis
on which to punish offenders.23 0 Once one accepts that many current
sentencing schemes base offenders' punishments on at least some of
the harms they cause, though, holding offenders liable for the more
remote harms that their conduct causes makes more sense.' Still,
because mens rea is considered foundational to criminal justice,
perhaps there is reason not to punish offenders more severely for
the most remote effects of their criminal conduct but to instead limit
the application of harm-based retribution to some extent.23 2
One might also be troubled by taking into account the
more remote harms caused by an offender's criminal conduct
because those harms are not specifically proscribed by statute.
Surely, one of the essential elements of criminal law is that
the prohibited conduct must be detailed in advance by
statute.23 3 This serves the function of providing notice to wouldbe criminal offenders that they likely will be punished for their
wrongful actions. 234 However, there is no clear requirement
that harms for which punishment is doled out, instead of the
conduct leading to criminal liability, must be specified in
advance by statute. In fact, a number of criminal statutes do
not specify any particular harm to be caused before even
criminal liability attaches, let alone any form of punishment.2 35
See supra text accompanying notes 63-68.
230.
231.
Cf David D. Friedman, Should the Characteristicsof Victims and Criminals
Count?: Payne v. Tennessee and Two Views of Efficient Punishment, 34 B.C. L. REV. 731,
763-69 (1993) (suggesting that, under retributive theories of punishment, harms that a
criminal offender caused but did not foresee might be relevant and that consequentialist
theories of punishment buttress the conclusion that they should be deemed relevant).
For a proposed limitation on accounting for these more harms, see infra Part VI.
232.
See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 11 (4th ed. 2003) (explaining the principle
233.
of legality-that a "basic premise of the criminal law is that conduct is not criminal unless
forbidden by law which gives advance warning that such conduct is criminal"); see also
Elliot Greenfield, A Lenity Exception to Chevron Deference, 58 BAYLOR L. REV. 1, 9 (2006)
("The 'principle of legality' (in Latin, nulla poena sine lege) requires that criminal laws be
specified in advance by statute." (footnote omitted)).
John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Legality, Vagueness, and the Construction of Penal
234.
Statutes, 71 VA. L. REV. 189, 205 (1985).
Criminal statutes are of two types: those that specify a prohibited harm and
235.
those that do not. See LAFAVE, supra note 233, at 331 (explaining that "some crimes are
defined in such a way that the occurrence of a certain specific result of conduct is required
for its commission," but other "crimes are so defined that conduct accompanied by an
intention to cause a harmful result may constitute the crime without regard to whether
that result actually occurs"). Professor LaFave cites murder as an example of a crime in
which causation of a harm is required for criminal liability, and he cites perjury as an
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For example, under New York law, driving while intoxicated is
a misdemeanor punishable by up to a year in jail, even if the
offender driving in such a state does not cause any obvious
harm."' Criminal liability is presumably imposed for the risk
of harm that the offender's actions have created,237 and
punishment is likely also premised upon this risk of harm. Yet,
New York law does not articulate that it is this risk of harm
that punishment is based upon,"' thus neither the harms nor
risk of harms that the offender's conduct cause are specified by
statute. 239 Accordingly, the fact that the more remote harms of
an offender's conduct are similarly unspecified by statute
should act as no more of an impediment to courts accounting
for such harms in sentencing. Again, though, there should
perhaps be a limit on the extent of the more remote harms to
be considered.
Another hypothesis for why courts and scholars have
overlooked these more remote harms in sentencing is that
holding an offender responsible for such harms could lead to
limitless criminal liability. As Andrew von Hirsch explained in
the related context of determining an offender's guilt,
extending criminalization to conduct that causes only remote
harms limits one's liberty24 0 because "all sorts of seemingly
innocent things [one does] may ultimately have deleterious
consequences,"24 ' and "virtually anything a person might do
could be criminalized on grounds of its potential for harmful
imitations."24 2 While von Hirsch's concern applies only to
example of a crime for which no harmful result is required before criminal liability is
imposed. Id.
236.
N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW H§ 1192-1193 (McKinney 2010).
237.
See People v. Cintron, 13 Misc. 3d 833, 852 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2006); Marcelo
Ferrante, Deterrenceand Crime Results, 10 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 1, 6 (2007) (explaining that
negligent or reckless behavior, if it fails to bring about harm, may amount to only "a
relatively minor endangerment offense, like driving while intoxicated"); John B. Mitchell
& Kelly Kunsch, Of Driver's Licenses and Debtor's Prison, 4 SEATTLE J. Soc. JUST. 439,
454 (2005) ("The fact that someone is driving without a valid license neither causes actual
harm nor necessarily increases any risk of harm, unlike other driving offenses such as
reckless driving, driving while intoxicated, or vehicular homicide.").
238.
See N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW §§ 1192-1193 (McKinney 2010).
239.
Further, in nonguidelines, and even guidelines, sentencing systems, judges are
ordinarily afforded a fair amount of discretion in setting offenders' sentences. See United
States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 223 (2005). In United States v. Booker, for example, the
Court stated that it "ha[s] never doubted the authority of a judge to exercise broad
discretion in imposing a sentence within a statutory range." Id.
240.
Andrew von Hirsch, Extending the Harm Principle: 'Remote' Harms and Fair
Imputation, in HARM AND CULPABILITY 262, 270, 275 (A.P. Simester & A.T.H. Smith eds.,
1996).
241.
Id. at 260.
242.
Id. at 270.
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criminalizing conduct in the first place,'4 ' an analogous concern
might arise if the retribution imposed on an offender were to
reflect the more remote harms caused by the offender's
criminal conduct. This specious threat of limitless criminal
liability, though, should not serve as a deterrent to courts
accounting for more remote harms in sentencing. Although
there is little discourse relating to this concern of limitless
liability in the context of criminal law, civil tort law is replete
with discussion on this issue244 and these tort law exchanges
focus on the concerns of justice and prudential limitations.24 5
While it may seem fundamentally unfair to hold an offender
liable for harms that are only tangentially related to his
conduct,"" considering these more remote harms in sentencing
may actually advance the concept of justice because subjecting
an offender to the possibility of greater punishment for causing
more extensive harms could better reflect the penological
purpose of retribution, along with the supplemental benefit of
additional deterrence.2 47 Further, accounting for the more
remote harms of an offender's conduct could be limited by the
legal construct of proximate causation just as this concept is
used as a tool of limitation in tort law and just as it limits
criminal liability in the first instance."' Applying such a
proximate causation analysis to the problem would likely
resolve the prudential concerns raised by considering the more
remote harms that an offender's conduct causes by saving
courts from having to delve into the most remote harms caused
by an offender's conduct if those harms are unforeseeable or
too indirect. Moreover, the potentially foreseeable harms of
offenders' criminal conduct, such as the costs of trial and
punishment, increased taxes, and decreased property values,2 49
while perhaps difficult to pinpoint in every case, could be
approximated relatively easily by looking at the type of crime

243.

Id. at 260.

244. For example, in the famous case of Palsgrafv. Long Island Railroad Co., Justice
Andrews, in dissent, expressed this concept in his analysis of proximate causation. See Palsgraf
v. Long Island RR. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 102-03 (N.Y. 1928) (Andrews, J., dissenting) (stating that
courts "cannot trace the effect of an act to the end, if end there is").
245. See 2 DOBBS, supra note 219, at 446 ("Judgments about proximate cause ... at
least roughly speaking, ... reflect the ideas of justice as well as practicality.").
246. Of supra text accompanying notes 223-32 (discussing the concern of holding an
offender responsible for consequences he may not have intended).
247. See supra text accompanying notes 210-17.
248. See LAFAVE, supra note 233, at 336-37 (comparing the tort and criminal
requirements of proximate causation); infra Part VI.
249. See supra text accompanying notes 195-96.
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involved, the location in which the crime was committed,25 0 and
the average amount spent on trial and offender punishments.'
Another reason why current sentencing practices and
scholarship may neglect to consider more remote harms is the
belief that such effects might be better redressed in the civil tort
process.5 Many scholars have argued that the American system
250. One might argue that taking into account the location in which a crime was
committed might exacerbate the problems of inner-city crime because it could create the
incentive of committing crimes in localities that already have low property values. But this
concern could perhaps be ameliorated by using the average, rather than the individual, localerelated costs of harm in the analysis. This has the disadvantage, however, of creating a
variance between the offender's just deserts and the actual sentence imposed.
251. Cf supra text accompanying note 91 (noting difficulties in making similar
approximations). One might argue that taking into account the costs of trial and
punishment might unconstitutionally encourage criminal defendants to forgo their rights
to trial and instead plea-bargain because it is less costly. See infra text accompanying
notes 267-68. This, too, is an interesting issue that requires further investigation.
252. Related to this issue of over-criminalization, one might be concerned that
extending the concept of retribution to harms beyond those most directly caused by an
offender might result in an offender effectively being punished twice for one instance of
harmful conduct because he could also be found liable in tort for the same harmful
consequences. This regard for double punishment for the same underlying conduct,
however, constitutes something of a red herring because inherent in this argument is the
notion that, like criminal punishment, civil liability and the accompanying payment
obligations constitute punishment. As the Supreme Court has explained, however, civil
liability does not ordinarily constitute punishment. See Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S.
93, 99 (1997) (emphasizing that the Double Jeopardy Clause "protects only against the
imposition of multiple criminal punishments for the same offense" and explaining that,
while some civil penalties may rise to the level of a criminal punishment, this is only the
case when the civil "statutory scheme was so punitive either in purpose or effect as to
transform what was clearly intended as a civil remedy into a criminal penalty" (citation
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Joshua Steinglass, The Justice
System in Jeopardy:The Prohibitionon Government Appeals ofAcquittals, 31 IND. L. REV.

353, 378 n.177 (1998) ("[Clivil tort actions for wrongful death ... do not violate the Double
Jeopardy Clause when they follow criminal acquittals on charges of murder. . . .").
Although an offender could potentially be liable for the results of his conduct in both
criminal law and tort law, there is already significant overlap between criminal and civil

law, and an offender can indeed be prosecuted and convicted for an offense and also be
held civilly liable for the same underlying conduct. For example, an offender could be
convicted of murder and also found civilly liable in a wrongful death or survival suit. See
infra text accompanying notes 306-14. Even if there were a concern about punishing an
offender twice for the same underlying conduct, however, which would essentially be punishing
him more than he deserved, perhaps such a concern should be dealt with as a matter of policy
rather than as a systematic exclusion of harms from sentence consideration. After all, if a
defendant's sentence does not completely account for the harms he caused and if he were not
sued in civil court for these harms, he would be receiving less punishment than he deserved.
See infra text accompanying note 257. As a model, the U.S. Department of Justice deals with
this concern of over-punishment on a regular basis, and its response, most commonly known as
the Petite Policy, is documented in its Attorneys' Manual:
Although there is no general statutory bar to a federal prosecution where the
defendant's conduct already has formed the basis for a state prosecution,
Congress expressly has provided that, as to certain offenses, a state judgment of
conviction or acquittal on the merits shall be a bar to any subsequent federal
prosecution for the same act or acts.
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has become "over-criminalized," which will ultimately lead to
"injustice, and ... will weaken the efficacy of the criminal law as
an instrument of social control."25 3 Scholars making this
argument focus on the criminal law's attempts to shoehorn
increasing types of conduct into the public welfare offense
category of crimes, resulting in criminal law's usurpation of
wrongful conduct not requiring mens rea.m" Accordingly, these
scholars emphasize criminal law's unique role in teaching the
public about morality and condemning offenders for their
harmful actions,2 55 and they argue that criminalizing conduct
that is not morally repugnant ultimately weakens the moral
message that criminal law conveys to society.256 While including
more remote harms in sentencing analysis could increase a
number of offenders' punishments, it would not amount to
holding criminally liable offenders who were not guilty of
criminal conduct. Accordingly, it affects punishments in a
different way than criminalizing conduct that should arguably
constitute only a civil tort. In acknowledging a greater breadth of
harms that offenders cause, including more remote harms in
sentencing would simply improve the proportionality between the
offender's conduct and his received punishment and more
effectively express to society the seriousness of offenders'
criminal conduct.257
Further, opponents of taking into account the more remote
harms of criminal conduct might emphasize that American
jurisdictions already punish most offenders too severely,25 8 and
UNITED

STATEs

ATTORNEYS'

MANUAL

§

9-2.031

(1997),

available

at

http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia-reading-room/usam/ (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 659, 660,
1992, 2101, 2117, and 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-36, 1282, and stating that one of the main
purposes of the policy is "to protect persons charged with criminal conduct from the
burdens associated with multiple prosecutions and punishments for substantially the
same act(s) or transaction(s)"). Similarly, if civil liability were considered punishment,
courts could account for this by modifying an offender's sentence accordingly.
253. John C. Coffee, Jr., Does "Unlawful" Mean "Criminal"?: Reflections on the
DisappearingTort/CrimeDistinction in American Law, 71 B.U. L. REV. 193, 193 (1991).

254.
255.
256.
257.

See id. at 215-19.
See id. at 223.
See id. at 235-36.
See supra text accompanying notes 214-15, 220-21.

See Todd R. Clear & James Austin, Reducing Mass Incarceration:
258.
Implications of the Iron Law of PrisonPopulations, 3 HARV. L. & POL'Y REV. 307, 307

(2009) (explaining that the "state and federal governments [have] tripled the
percentage of convicted felons sentenced to confinement and doubled the length of
their sentences," leading to the United States' status as an outlier in punishment
practices, "not only among prevailing practices in the Western world, but also in
comparison to the United States' own long-standing practices"); Daniel Ibsen
Morales, In Democracy's Shadow: Fences, Raids, and the Production of Migrant

Illegality, 5 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 23, 59 (2009) ("[Blecause the popular conception of
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taking into account further harms in sentencing will only
exacerbate the problem. To the extent that considering such
harms will lead to harsher punishments in the United States is a
valid concern, however, this is a complaint better levied against
the high base levels of American sentencing ranges, rather than
the determination of which harms should be considered in
assessing an individual's desert. Omitting these more remote
harms from sentencing consideration undermines equality
among offenders' punishments because it essentially places
offenders causing only the most direct harms on the same plane
as offenders also causing more remote harms through their
criminal actions.25
One concern raised in reaction to introducing victim impact
evidence at the sentencing stage is that doing so could amount to
ranking victims, and this same concern might be registered
against accounting for the more remote harms that an offender's
conduct causes in determining the appropriate sentence to
impose. In response to the Supreme Court's 1991 decision in
Payne v. Tennessee,2 60 in which the Court determined that it was
not unconstitutional for juries to consider victim impact evidence
at sentencing in capital cases,2 6' scholars argued that allowing
jurors to consider these harms resulting from a defendant's
criminal conduct would effectively "enhance certain victims by
identifying them as worthier than other [victims or members of
society]."262 Moreover, there is fear that this comparison of

criminal justice is retributive and degrading, the United States imposes and enforces
some of the harshest punishments in the Western world.").
259.
See supra text accompanying notes 214-15. Further, taking into account more
remote harms in sentencing could actually decrease sentences in certain situations if
accounting for such harms were viewed through the lens of "balanc[ing]" the offense with
the harm to the victims as the Kennedy Court suggested. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S.
407, 442 (2008); see supra text accompanying notes 158-65. While this sense of
"balanc[ing]" seems not to be at the core of retributivism but instead a creation of the
Kennedy Court, see Heidi M. Hurd, Paper, Death to Rapists: A Comment on Kennedy v.
Louisiana, 6 OHIo ST. J. CRIM. L. 351, 356 (2008), suggesting that allowing such harms to
ironically decrease the sentences of the worst offenders is perhaps an unwise decision.
260. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991).
Id. at 825-27, 830.
261.
262.
Vivian Berger, Payne and Suffering-A Personal Reflection and a Victim-Centered
Critique, 20 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 21, 44-47 (1992); see also Jos6 Felip6 Anderson, Will the
Punishment Fit the Victims? The Case for Pre-TrialDisclosure,and the Uncharted Future
of Victim Impact Information in CapitalJury Sentencing, 28 RUTGERS L.J. 367, 406 (1997)
(expressing concern that consideration of victim impact evidence may cause sentencing
hearings to devolve "into presentations of 'the worth of the victim'"); Markus Dirk Dubber,
Regulating the Tender Heart When the Axe Is Ready to Strike, 41 BUFF. L. REV. 85, 131
(1993) (asserting that retributivism "prohibits distinctions between the lives of persons on
the basis of their societal worth"); Logan, supra note 171, at 157-59 (noting some courts'
concern that consideration of victim impact evidence encourages comparing a victim's
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victims will be based on invidious and intolerable distinctions,
such as race.' This matter of victim ranking, however, is based
on the premise that some victims are indeed more valuable than
others.' While one might argue that the hard-working father of
four is more valuable in the eyes of society than a homeless man
who has no family and only a few friends, that is not necessarily
the case, and it is not an assumption requisite to measuring the
harms caused by an offender's criminal conduct. Accounting for
harms an offender's conduct causes in society-beyond the
immediate and most direct harms of the offender's criminal
conduct-does not incontrovertibly translate into assessing the
worth of his victims."' The cause of greater harms in society
could be a result of factors other than a particular victim's
worth-such as the offender's choice of method for committing
his crime or the sheer number of victims of his crime. Imposing a
harsher sentence on an offender does not necessarily mean that
his victims' lives were worth more; it just means that he has
caused greater societal harm in addition to that of his most
immediate victim's injury. While imposing a greater sentence
will serve the expressive function of conveying to society the
extent of the harms caused, it will not serve, and does not
purport to serve, the function of conveying to society the relative
worths of the offender's victims.266
Some theorists might also pinpoint particular remote harms
that should not be considered in sentencing. For example, one
might argue that the harms related to a criminal offender's
worth to the worth of other members of society). But see Dubber, supra, at 133-34
(couching ranking based on a victim's societal worth as a consequentialist concern rather
than a retributive one). Scholars' identification of this issue may have been triggered by
Justice Stevens's dissent in Payne, in which he suggested that evidence relating to the
differences among various victims "can only be intended to identify some victims as more
worthy of protection than others" and that distinguishing between victims "risks decisions
based on ... invidious motives," such as race. Payne, 501 U.S. at 866 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
263. Berger, supra note 262, at 47-48. Indeed, this is the same concern that was
addressed in McCleskey v. Kemp, in which the Supreme Court rejected the defendant's
equal protection challenge that was based on a study suggesting that the death penalty
was more often imposed on defendants who had killed black victims than on defendants
who had killed white victims and the punishment was imposed more frequently on black
murderers than white murderers. See McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 291-99 (1986).
264. See Berger, supra note 262, at 44-45.
265. Cf Friedman, supra note 231, at 750 ("If the objective of victim impact
statements is not to give the jury special information about why one victim is more
deserving than another, but rather to remind the jury of the value of the lives of victims,
then no comparative judgment among victims is required." (emphasis omitted)).
266. Cf Payne, 501 U.S. at 823 (explaining that "victim impact evidence is not
offered to encourage comparative judgments . .. [but is instead] designed to show . .. each
victim's 'uniqueness as an individual human being. . . .").
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trial-such as the cost of trial or the harms imposed upon a child
rape victim in having to testify against her rapist-should not be
considered harmful in the law's eyes because it undermines an
offender's constitutional right to trial or because trial constitutes
a public good.267 Certainly, a defendant's right to trial and the
concomitant benefits that trials provide-such as enforcing the
rule of law, lending credibility and authority to the court system
and to the government in general, satisfying the community's
urge to punish, educating the public about the law, and
reaffirming some basic principles of American democracy2-are
important. While recognizing more remote harms, such as those
caused to testifiers at criminal trials, may acknowledge the
importance of trial and the suffering that the testifiers endure by
requiring the offender to pay for these harms, offenders might be
deterred from exercising their rights to trial if this could result in
greater harms and thus more stringent punishments. This is
similar to the difficulty experienced in our current criminal
landscape of extensive plea bargaining practices. Such deterrence
not only impinges on a defendant's right to trial and due process
rights but it also detracts from the other goods provided by
criminal trials. Even though the Court has not found a
constitutional violation of one's right to trial or due process rights
in the plea bargaining context, a criminal defendant would not be

267. One might similarly argue that the more remote harmful effects related to
an offender's trial should not be considered because those harms are, in effect,
canceled out by the burdens that a trial also imposes on the offender. Aside from the
fears of conviction and subsequent punishment, which are arguably deserved when a
defendant is guilty of an offense, criminal defendants facing trial do indeed suffer
further tribulations. As one scholar has explained, trial is "expensive, terrifying,
frustrating, infuriating, humiliating, time-consuming, perhaps all-consuming." David
Luban, Settlements and the Erosion of the Public Realm, 83 GEO. L.J. 2619, 2621
(1995); see also Susan J. Szmania & Daniel E. Mangis, Finding the Right Time and
Place:A Case Study Comparison of the Expression of Offender Remorse in Traditional
Justice and Restorative Justice Contexts, 89 MARQ. L. REv. 335, 342 (2005) ("For many

criminal defendants, they may be humiliated by the presence of others in the
courtroom such as family members or victims."). This cancellation argument,
however, while creative, lacks the force to overcome the foundation of retributivism:
imposing on the offender the punishment that he deserves. While the offender,
himself, certainly suffers as a result of having to endure the hardships of trial, see
supra text accompanying notes 201-204, the mathematical invention that these
harms cancel out harms to others has no solid basis in law or theory. In fact, instead
of cancelling out other harms, one could argue that the harms the offender causes to
himself by having to undergo the hardships of trial should lead to a more stringent
punishment being imposed on the offender. See infra text accompanying note 269.
See Paul Butler, The Case for Trials: Considering the Intangibles, 1 J.
268.
EMPIRIcAL LEGAL STUD. 627, 630-31 (2004); Michael German, Trying Enemy Combatants
in Civilian Courts, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1421, 1426 (2007); Luban, supra note 267, at
2625; Gerhard O.W. Mueller, Problems Posed by Publicity to Crime and Criminal
Proceedings, 110 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 6 (1961).
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afforded the same benefit of the bargain-a lesser charge or
sentence in exchange for a guilty plea-in the context of
considering more remote harms at sentencing. Thus, despite any
benefits of remaining true to a harm-based theory of retribution,
these right-to-trial and due process concerns suggest at least a
policy reason to limit the number and type of more remote harms
that should be considered in sentencing.
Finally, one might argue that accounting for the more
remote harms resulting from the punishment the offender
receives and the stigma attached to his accusal, conviction, and
sentencing26-such as the harms inflicted on the offender,
himself, or on his family, friends, and acquaintances-would lead
to consideration of exponentially increasing harms and that this
would be senseless and unjust. For example, imagine an offender
who deserves a sentence of five years' imprisonment for the
direct harms resulting from his criminal conduct. If the
sentencing court were to also take into account the harms this
offender caused to himself and to his family, friends, and
acquaintances, then he would deserve a harsher sentence. One
could argue that this harsher sentence, though, would cause
greater harms to the offender, himself, and his family, friends,
and acquaintances. Accordingly, the offender would deserve an
even harsher sentence. This reasoning could continue indefinitely
and, in the extreme, an offender could receive the harshest
sentence available for a relatively minor offense. This concern,
then, especially calls for a limitation on the remote harms to be
considered in sentencing criminal offenders.
VI. AN ISSUE COTERMINOUS WITH PROXIMATE CAUSATION
All of these concerns related to accounting for the remote
harms of an offender's criminal conduct when sentencing may
explain why courts and scholars have largely neglected to consider
such harms. But, again, it seems that the theory of harm-based
retribution makes no distinction between these harms and those
most directly caused by a criminal offender's conduct. Perhaps
consideration of these harms is a reason to reject harm-based
retributivism in its entirety-a position that many scholars have
taken. 0 But, considering our current sentencing landscape,27 ' it
seems unlikely that actual sentencing practices will begin

269.

See supra text accompanying notes 201-09.

270. See Moore, supra note 65, at 238-39 (explaining that the "standard educated
view" denies "wrongdoing" as relevant to determining an offender's desert).
271. See supra text accompanying notes 40-41 and Part III.A.
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completely ignoring any harms of criminal conduct. Perhaps a more
sensible solution is to provide some direction for which harms
should be deemed relevant in sentencing.
Many of the concerns raised revolve around issues such as
the offender's intentions, his knowledge, or his freedom of
action.2 72 For example, a deficit of mens rea relates to the
concern that the offender would be punished for harms that he
did not intend.2 72 Similarly, the notice issue that the lack of
statutory enumeration of harms raises relates to the concern
that the offender's punishment could be based on something of
which he had no prior knowledge.274 This, and the related
concern of limitless liability, could chill the would-be offender's
freedom of action.275 Even the concern that already-too-severely
punished offenders could be punished even more severely,276 in
some sense, restricts an offender's freedom of action by
potentially incapacitating him for a longer period of time.
These concerns of intention, knowledge, and freedom of action
are the same concerns that have led courts to impose
proximate causation limitations in the criminal liability and
torts contexts.2 7 In criminal law, the issue of proximate
causation ordinarily arises in the context of determining a
defendant's guilt.2 78 In this situation, experts contend that
proximate causation becomes a relevant issue primarily when
an actor intends one wrongful result, or culpably risks such a
result, but a different wrongful result materializes. 7' For
example, suppose that an actor "pours a large quantity of
gasoline into the first floor of a building with a large number of
people in it, and lights the fluid; but instead of death from fire, an
individual falls because the floor is slippery, hits his head, and
dies."280 While factual causation almost certainly exists-because,

See supra text accompanying notes 224-31 (analyzing the role of mens rea in
272.
the determination of criminal liability).
See supra text accompanying notes 223-32.
273.
274.
See supra text accompanying notes 233-39.
See supra text accompanying notes 233-51.
275.
See supra text accompanying notes 258-59.
276.
The term "proximate causation" is sometimes alternatively referred to as
277.
"legal causation." See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 12, at 250 (equating the
terms "proximate cause" and "legal cause").
See LAFAVE, supra note 233, at 336-37.
278.
279.
Id. at 336. Such a result could differ in terms of the individual or property that
was harmed, the type or degree of harm that resulted, or the manner in which the harm
occurred. Id.
David Crump, Reconsidering the Felony Murder Rule in Light of Modern
280.
Criticisms: Doesn't the Conclusion Depend Upon the ParticularRule at Issue?, 32 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1155, 1168 (2009) (setting forth this example). Most typically, the issue
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but for the actor pouring the gasoline onto the floor, the victim
would not have slipped, fallen, and died-there is a question of
whether proximate causation is also present."' Thus, the
question remains of whether legal policy dictates that society
should hold this actor criminally liable.2 82
When courts evaluate whether a defendant's conduct has
proximately caused a particular result, they often focus their
examination on the issue of foreseeability. They ask, for example,
whether the general manner in which the harm came about was
foreseeable to a reasonable person in the defendant's position.283
Consider the Minnesota Supreme Court case of State v.
Schaub,284 in which the court had to determine whether a
defendant could be convicted of manslaughter when the
defendant unscrewed a gas line in his apartment in an attempt
to commit suicide, police officers subsequently removed the
defendant from his apartment, and the accumulated gas later
caused an explosion in the building that ultimately killed
another resident.285 The court concluded that criminal liability
was feasible in this circumstance because proximate causation
"rests largely on a determination of what ought to have been
foreseeable to defendant as the probable result of the dangerous
situation which he had created," and the other resident's death
was foreseeable. 288 This question of foreseeability is sometimes
expressed in other terms. For example, in one California case, 287a
court instead asked whether the harmful result was the "natural
and probable consequence" of the defendant's actions, 288 and in
another case, a California court examined whether the suffered
harm was "within the risk of harm created by the defendant's

of proximate causation seen in the criminal law context is in cases dealing with homicide.
LAFAVE, supra note 233, at 336.
281. See LAFAVE, supra note 233, at 336-37.
282. See id. at 337.
283. See State v. Schaub, 44 N.W.2d 61, 64 (Minn. 1950) (holding that a criminal
defendant can be found guilty "if the end result itself was foreseeable"); Robinson, supra
note 63, at 148 (describing the deontological concept of "desert" that takes into account,
not just the harm caused by the offender, but also "the broad array of forces operating
upon the individual").
284. Schaub, 44 N.W.2d at 64.
285. Id. at 62-63.
286. Id. at 64-65.
287.
People v. Concha, 218 P.3d 660 (Cal. 2009).
288. Id. at 664 (quoting People v. Roberts, 826 P.2d 274, 301 (Cal. 1992)); see also
People v. Dawson, 91 Cal. Rptr. 3d 841, 856 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009) (explaining proximate
causation as existing when the "direct, natural and probable consequence" of the actor's
conduct caused the prohibited harm).
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negligent conduct."28 9 Ultimately, however, these approximate
issues of foreseeability, as does the common proximate causation
question of whether an intervening or superseding causeessentially unforeseeable events-broke the chain of causation
such that there is no proximate causation.290
While foreseeability is ordinarily the touchstone for courts'
proximate causation analyses, some courts instead examine the
notion of directness, which, in certain scenarios, may differ
somewhat from foreseeability.2 9' For example, in the
Pennsylvania case of Commonwealth v. Root,292 the majority
adopted this rather different view of proximate causation.293 In
that case, the defendant accepted his acquaintance's challenge to
engage in an automobile race on a rural highway.2 9 4 Both
participants were driving in excess of the speed limit, and the
defendant's acquaintance was driving in the lane designated for
oncoming traffic.2 95 The acquaintance collided with an oncoming
vehicle and was killed.296 The defendant was charged and
convicted of involuntary manslaughter, but the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania overturned the defendant's conviction because it
determined that the defendant's conduct did not proximately
cause the decedent's death.297 According to the court, a "more
direct causal connection [was] required for conviction" in this
case.298 While the Root majority focused on the concept of
directness in evaluating proximate causation, Justice Eagen's
dissent in Root instead focused more on the concept of
foreseeabilty.299 Justice Eagen argued that the decedent's actions

Dawson, 91 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 857.
289.
See, e.g., Schaub, 44 N.W.2d at 64 ('To sustain a conviction for manslaughter"-the
290.
offense at issue in the case-"the act of defendant must have been the proximate cause of the
death of [the victim] without the intervention of an efficient independent force in which
defendant did not participate or which he could not reasonably have foreseen.").
See Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 268 (1991); LAFAVE,
291.
supra note 233, at 343, 349.
Commonwealth v. Root, 170 A.2d 310 (Pa. 1961).
292.
293.
See id. at 311-14.
Id. at 310.
294.
295.
Id. at 310-11.
Id. at 311.
296.
See id. at 311-14.
297.
Id. at 314.
298.
Id. at 315 (Eagen, J., dissenting). Justice Eagen also made the interesting point
299.
in his dissent that criminal law protects the people of the state, not just the victim of a
crime, and he suggested that this should be kept in mind in determining the defendant's
guilt. See id. at 318 ("While the victim's foolhardiness in this case contributed to his own
death, he was not the only one responsible and it is not he alone with whom we are
concerned. It is the people of the Commonwealth who are harmed by the kind of conduct
the defendant pursued. Their interests must be kept in mind.").
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under the pressure-laden circumstances to which the defendant
contributed "should have been expected and [were] clearly
foreseeable." 00
Courts thus analyze proximate causation in their pursuit of
determining whether a defendant is guilty of an offense, but in
the criminal context, they have not ordinarily used the concept to
determine the extent of an offender's desert."o' Thus, while in
Schaub the court engaged in a foreseeability analysis to
determine whether the defendant was criminally liable,302 it is
rare that a court would extend its proximate causation analysis
in such a case to determine whether the defendant's punishment
should be more severe because his actions caused harms other
than the most immediate victim's injury-such as emotional
harms to the victim's friends and family resulting from this
injury, emotional harms to the offender's friends and family
resulting from his offensive actions and conviction, or costs
resulting from the police officers' need to intervene .ao Instead,
when sentencing, courts limit their analyses to the most direct
harms of the criminal offense.
Although this proximate causation analysis of the extent of
criminal harms caused by offender conduct is lacking from most
criminal proximate causation analyses, perhaps some guidance
may be gleaned from courts' examinations of proximate causation
in the context of civil torts. Indeed, a number of courts have
concluded that their criminal proximate causation analyses
closely resemble their proximate causation analyses in tort law. 3 04
While in the civil tort context, courts still primarily examine the
issue of proximate causation for determining whether a
defendant is liable, the tort causation analysis is also somewhat
more flexible because it can more closely reflect the extent of
harm caused by the defendant. This difference in accounting for
more remote harms in the criminal and tort contexts stems from
the fact that these harms resulting from criminal conduct are
often not statutorily proscribed and thus producing them is not

300. Id. at 315.
301.
Cf, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006) (listing factors to be considered in imposing a
sentence but failing to mention the concept of proximate causation).
302.
See supra text accompanying notes 284-86.
303.
See supra text accompanying notes 180-209 (discussing possible indirect or
remote harms that may result from criminal conduct).
See, e.g., People v. Dawson, 91 Cal. Rptr. 3d 841, 855 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009) ("It is well
304.
established that the principles of causation as they apply to tort law are equally applicable to
criminal law."); State v. Schaub, 44 N.W.2d 61, 64-65 (Minn. 1950) (examining a number of
civil tort cases to further explore the issue of proximate causation in a criminal case).
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often a criminal offense in its own right.05 In the tort context,
however, a defendant may be liable for almost any harms at least
negligently caused because, unlike in the criminal context, a
statutory proscription is not a prerequisite for liability. For
example, if Jane murders John, she may be found criminally
liable for that murder. Her punishment, which will likely be
severe, will probably not take into account harms caused by Jane's
actions other than the direct result of her actions: John's death. Her
punishment likely will not take into account the effect of John's
death on his friends and family or the effect of Jane's conviction and
sentencing on her own friends and family, for example. In contrast,
in tort, Jane might be liable for John's death through either a
survival action or a wrongful death suit brought by John's
spouse. The survival action-which would focus on what the
deceased individual would have been able to recover had he
survived3 o'-would be comparable to the murder charge in the
criminal context because it would deal with the consequences
of the most direct harms caused by Jane's action: John's
suffering upon his death."o' The wrongful death action,
though-which would constitute an action to recover for the
injuries suffered by those surviving Johnsos-would take into
account other harms that Jane had proximately caused with
the requisite state of mind. Recovery under a wrongful death
action could include reasonable expenses for John's funeral,...
John's lost financial support of 3the
survivors,"0 loss of
11
311
ditrss
or even punitive
emotional distress,
consortium,
305.
Cf Kenneth W. Simons, The Crime/Tort Distinction: Legal Doctrine and
Normative Perspectives, 17 WIDENER L.J. 719, 724-25 (2008) (explaining that tort law
provides a more flexible framework than criminal law and so can accommodate more
forms of wrongdoing).
306.
2 DOBBS, supra note 219, at 804.
307.
Id. There is certainly a difference, though, between the injuries of death and
suffering.
308. Id.
309.
See, e.g., N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 5-4.3(a) (McKinney 2010) (stating
that a plaintiffs damages may include "reasonable funeral expenses of the decedent").
310.
See, e.g., Freeman v. Davidson, 768 P.2d 885, 887 (Nev. 1989) (explaining that
Nevada law "allows heirs to prove damages for loss of probable support").
311.
See, e.g., Bullard v. Barnes, 468 N.E.2d 1228, 1232 (111. 1984) ("[T]his court quite
recently unanimously held, based on a broad definition of pecuniary injury, that a
widowed spouse had the right to recover damages for loss of consortium under the
Wrongful Death Act."). Loss of consortium could include "loss of companionship, society,
love, advice [or] guidance." 2 DOBBS, supra note 219, at 812.
312.
See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-62-102(f)(1) (2005) (providing that "[tihe jury or
the court, in cases tried without a jury, may fix such damages as will be fair and just
compensation for pecuniary injuries, including .. . any mental anguish resulting from the
death to the surviving spouse and beneficiaries of the deceased"); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10,
§ 3724(d)(5) (1999) (providing that "[i]n determining the amount of the award[,] the court or
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damages.' Liability under the wrongful death claim, then,
would take into account a number of the harms Jane caused that
would not be accounted for in the criminal context. Further, in
the tort context, Jane would also be potentially liable for harms
caused to bystanders witnessing John's death.314 Again, these
likely constitute harms not ordinarily contemplated in
determining a criminal offender's desert. To be sure, harms
resulting from tortious conduct are limited-not only by
proximate causation, but also by other restraints such as the
economic loss doctrine.15 Yet, tort law still takes into account a
greater spectrum of harms than those ordinarily considered in
the criminal context.16
Despite its appeal, it seems that a proximate causation
limitation does not explain why courts have largely neglected to
address which harms are appropriate to consider in sentencing.
If such a civil tort proximate causation analysis were applied to
the remote harms not often considered in sentencing, it is likely
that at least some of them would be deemed proximate on
occasion. Certainly, it is plausibly foreseeable to a reasonable
person that a victim's friends and family will suffer as a result of
an offender's criminal conduct, especially when the crime at issue

jury may consider .. . [mlental anguish resulting from such death to the surviving spouse and
next-of-kin of such deceased person"); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2125.02(B)(5) (LexisNexis
2007) (providing that "[clompensatory damages. . . awarded in a civil action for wrongful
death ... may include damages for ... [t]he mental anguish incurred by the surviving
spouse, dependent children, parents, or next of kin of the decedent").
See, e.g., N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 5-4.3(b) (McKinney 2010) (stating
313.
that "punitive damages may be awarded if such damages would have been recoverable
had the decedent survived"); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-18-2(b)(5) (2009) (providing that
"[d]amages recoverable for death by wrongful act include ... [sluch punitive damages as
the decedent could have recovered .. . had he survived, and punitive damages for
wrongfully causing the death of the decedent through malice or willful or wanton
conduct"); Portwood v. Copper Valley Elec. Ass'n, Inc., 785 P.2d 541, 543 (Alaska 1990)
(holding "that the estate of a decedent who dies without statutory beneficiaries is entitled
to seek punitive damages"); see also 2 DOBBS, supra note 219, at 813 (explaining that
"some courts have allowed punitive damages in spite of the [governing] statute's
pecuniary loss requirement").
314.
Bystander liability in tort law, though, is often limited beyond the notion of
proximate causation by ideas such as whether the plaintiff was closely related to the
victim or whether the plaintiff suffered emotional distress beyond that which a
disinterested witness would ordinarily suffer. See 2 DOBBS, supra note 219, at 839-41
(detailing the factors beyond proximate causation that limit bystander liability).
315.
See Ralph C. Anzivino, The Economic Loss Doctrine: DistinguishingEconomic
Loss from Non-Economic Loss, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 1081, 1082 (2008) (describing the
economic loss doctrine as requiring a buyer who suffers solely economic loss to recover
damages through contract law rather than tort law).
316.
See Stephen Marks, Utility and Community: Musings on the Tort/Crime
Distinction, 76 B.U. L. REV. 215, 239 (1996) (laying out the factors that account for the
higher diversity of tort proceedings than criminal proceedings).
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is exceptionally serious. This is particularly the case when the
criminal offense results in the victim's death or serious bodily
injury. Such harms might also be considered a direct result of the
offender's conduct. While perhaps more removed from the
criminal offense, some might also consider other harms as
reasonably foreseeable or direct such that they should be
contemplated by sentencers. These harms might include those
caused to businesses; costs associated with the offender's
apprehension, conviction, and punishment; and those inflicted on
individuals who identify with the victim. They might also include
the harms related to the offender's punishment, the stigma that
accompanies conviction and punishment, and the harms that this
can cause to the offender's family and friends. And while perhaps
not contemplated by a criminal offender at the time of his
offense, it is arguably reasonably foreseeable that a criminal
offense will cause members of society greater fear and anxiety,
and perhaps even cause members of the public to become
desensitized to criminal activity. Further, to an educated person,
the "broken windows" theory, harms to institutions, an increase
in taxes, and a decrease in property values might be
contemplated results of crime, but one could argue that this
would not be foreseeable to a reasonable person, especially one
situated as the typical would-be offender."' While these more
remote harms of criminal conduct are most often not as
foreseeable as the most direct harms of that conduct, and while
many of them are quite tenuous in nature, they are at least
worthy of contemplation at sentencing. They are similar to the
harms caused to rescuers or to patients by virtue of medical
malpractice in tort cases-both of which have been determined to
be foreseeable and thus proximate in many a tort case.318 Courts'
and scholars' neglect to engage in any sort of discussion of these
harms certainly suggests that they are not applying a proximate
causation analysis to exclude these harms from sentencing
contemplation--or at least not consciously applying such an
analysis. Such a limitation is desirable, though, in light of the many
concerns that accounting for those more remote harms raise.
Beyond this traditional proximate causation limitation,
there may be need for other limitations to implement policy goals

317.
Ordinarily, the proximate causation analysis focuses on whether a consequence
is foreseeable to a reasonable person rather than whether it is foreseeable to a would-be
offender or tortfeasor, however. See 2 Dobbs, supra note 219, at 334.
318.
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 457 (1965) (providing that the
person initially liable in a tort claim is also liable for any harm resulting from third
persons rendering aid, even if that aid is carried out in a negligent manner).

1106

HOUSTON LAW REVIEW

[48:5

not implicit in traditional proximate causation analyses. For
example,
concerns
about undermining
a defendant's
constitutional right to trial or exponential harms that an offender
causes to himself may justify further curtailing the consideration
of more remote harms in criminal sentencing. To ensure
consistency in sentencing among offenders and to more fully
implement harm-based retributive sentencing goals, though, it is
important that these other policy considerations are discussed
and clearly articulated.
VII. CONCLUSION

While courts and scholars have generally neglected .to
consider the more remote harms that an offender's criminal
conduct has caused, accounting for such harms in sentencing
could prove beneficial. It could increase the parity between an
offender's desert and the sentence imposed on him and could
provide for greater individualization among offenders. Further,
sentences based upon these more remote harms could add to the
deterrence value of the punishment and improve its expressive
and communicative characters. Accounting for these more remote
harms certainly raises concerns, however, such as punishing an
offender for harms he did not intend or the creation of limitless
liability. Limiting the remote harms considered at sentencing by
applying a proximate causation analysis would mitigate these
concerns. But harms such as those that the offender's conduct
imposes on the victim's family, friends, and society are certainly
worthy of consideration in sentencing.
Sentencers' entertainment of victim impact evidence fails to
effectively hold offenders accountable for these more remote
harms. Studies suggest that such evidence does not affect
criminal sentences, and even if it does, this evidence is usually
limited to harms caused to the victim herself, or to her closest
friends or family members."' Instead, accounting for these more
remote harms in sentencing guidelines, or at least educating
sentencers that all harms proximately caused by the offender's
criminal conduct should be considered, would aid in allowing
sentencers to provide for punishments that better reflect
offenders' harm-based deserts. Achieving greater proportionality
in sentencing is desirable, thus courts and scholars should more
carefully examine how to properly account for more remote
harms in sentencing.
319. See Davis & Smith, supra note 175, at 459, 467 (concluding from study that
victim impact statements did not influence sentencing decisions).

